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Almost seventy years after the Supreme Court sought to rationalize 
the American system of judicial federalism in Erie, sales law remains 
trapped in a pattern more reminiscent of the Swift v. Tyson era.  The 
extraordinarily wide separation of powers in the NCCUSL-ALI uniform 
law-making process has entrenched Article 2 of the UCC in the status quo.  
Concurrently, an imbalance between the federal and state courts in the 
American system of judicial federalism has conferred an unusually wide 
range of discretion over state commercial law on the federal courts.  
Ironically, therefore, state sales statutes are being reinterpreted and revised 
by the federal courts rather than the state legislatures or state courts.  The 
federal courts are thus the most important source of innovation and 
experimentation in modern American sales law, but the role they play is 
not entirely consistent with modern notions of democracy and judicial 
restraint.  Moreover, it is debatable whether they have, in exercising their 
discretion, brought much rationality and coherence to the law or simply 
injected uncertainty and disharmony instead.  At this point it appears that 
the pattern will persist.  Thus, it seems inevitable that American sales law 
will continue to diverge, not only across jurisdictions but further and 
further away from the rickety framework of Article 2.  American sales law 
therefore will not only continue to devolve into something more akin to 
the common law, it will remain an area of disjunction in which the federal 
courts play the dominant role in developing the law, even though the law 
is still formally within the authority of the states.   
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3INTRODUCTION 
 Modern American sales law is rife with controversy.1 There is an ongoing debate 
about such fundamental matters as the scope of Article 2, the rules governing the 
formation of sales contracts, the dearth of consumer protections, and the role of the 
federal courts in construing the law.2 The recent attempts to revise Article 2 have thus far 
ended in failure, and at this point it remains unclear whether sales law in the United 
States will remain uniform in the years ahead.3 Other authors have attributed the current 
dilemma to the commercial law-making process.4 While this article fully concurs, it 
argues that the deficiencies in the commercial law-making process are deeply rooted in 
the peculiarities of American judicial federalism.  The wide separation of powers over the 
enactment of new commercial law statutes together with an imbalance in the structure of 
American judicial federalism have left Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
deeply entrenched in the status quo while at the same time conferring an unusually wide 
range of discretion on the federal courts over the interpretation of state sales statutes.5 As 
a consequence, American sales law is being reinterpreted and revised not through the 
uniform law-making process but through the decisions of the federal courts. 
 
1 This was reflected in the title and subject of the recent Association of American Law Schools Conference 
on Commercial Law at the Crossroads, June 14-17, 2005 held in Montreal, Canada. 
2 See the discussion infra part III. 
3 Some prominent scholars have expressed skepticism.  See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of 
Article 2, 62 LA.L REV. 1009 (2002). 
4 Id. See also, Allan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 
U.PA.L.REV. 585, 639 (1995). 
5 See the discussion infra part II. 
4From a long-run perspective, what matters most is not so much the substance of 
the law itself at any point in time as the mechanisms for adapting and revising it in the 
face of the new problems and pressures created by social and economic changes.6 As a 
general matter, the law can be revised through the enactment of new statutes or through 
the decisions of courts.  In a federal system of government such as in the one in the 
United States new statutes can be enacted at the federal or state levels and decisions can 
be made by both federal and state courts.  The Constitution of the United States clearly 
assigns the authority to enact statutes in certain areas of the law to the federal government 
and leaves other areas to the states.7 The scope of federal authorities has expanded quite 
significantly over time, however, both because of underlying social and economic 
changes and because the Supreme Court has tended to interpret the federal authorities 
more broadly (perhaps because of the underlying social and economic changes).8
Consequently, most commercial law today is within the scope of the federal 
government’s constitutional authority over interstate commerce, yet, for historical 
reasons, most commercial law statutes are still enacted by state legislatures.  It is ironic, 
therefore, that the most important source of innovation and change in modern American 
sales law is from federal court decisions that reinterpret the state statutes. 
 
6 This is one of the main themes and concerns of new institutionalist economic historians, such as Douglas 
North, Gary Libecap, and Lee Alston.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
8 This has occurred most notably through an expansion in the federal government’s commerce clause 
powers.  See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUSTEIN, AND MARK V. 
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 189-233 ((1996) for an overview. 
5It is not, however, without historical precedent.  Indeed, the federal courts 
frequently sought to fashion general rules of commercial law that often departed from the 
state common law throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries.  The 
Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to their efforts in Swift v. Tyson.9 Unfortunately, the 
federal courts’ efforts failed to bring rationality and uniformity to American commercial 
law and merely exacerbated forum-shopping and all its injustices instead.  The Supreme 
Court ultimately overruled Swift v. Tyson in Erie v. Tomkins10 and held that the federal 
courts must follow state court precedents on questions of state law.  Erie purported to 
bring an end to an era in which the federal courts sought to develop a body of general 
common law.  As other scholars have documented, it was at best a mixed success.11 It is 
widely acknowledged that the federal courts continue to develop a body of general 
common law through their interpretations of federal statutes.12 
It is much less widely acknowledged, however, that the federal courts continue to 
play an important role in the development of state law, especially state commercial law.  
Indeed, the federal courts continue to render holdings on questions of state law that 
sometimes clearly contradict state statutes and state court precedents and that 
subsequently influence the development of state law.13 Nowhere is this more glaringly 
 
9 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
10 Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
11 See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law 83 NW.U.L. REV. 805 (1989) and Caleb Nelson, The 
Persistence of General Law, 105 COLUM.L.REV. 503 (2006). 
12 Id. 
13 Thus, the federal courts play an important role in the development of state common law generally.  As G. 
ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND 
6apparent than in the field of sales law.  Ironically, in spite of all of the lofty ideals of 
judicial federalism that the Supreme Court laid out in Erie, commercial law – and sales 
law in particular -- remains rooted in the Swift era.14 Erie may have clarified that the 
federal courts are supposed to abide by state court precedents on questions of state law, 
but the federal courts continue to exercise almost unbridled discretion over the 
interpretation of state commercial law statutes, in some cases rendering holdings that 
clearly contradict the statutes in their efforts to bring rationality and coherence to modern 
American sales law.15 
The first part of this article offers an overview of modern developments in 
American judicial federalism and argues that it has left an imbalance in the relative 
powers of the federal and state courts.  The second part draws on the comparative 
institutional analysis of the separation of powers in a Constitutional democracy to explain 
how this imbalance in American judicial federalism has resulted in the federal courts 
having far more discretion over the interpretation of state laws than the state courts, 
particularly within the sphere of commercial law.  On the one hand, this means that the 
federal courts have been an important source of experimentation and innovation in the 
law at a time when new technologies and commercial practices have created pressures for 
significant legal reform; on the other hand, it also means that the federal courts are 
 
NATION, 20 (1988) observe, “Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 1938 overruling Swift, the 
impact of federal courts on the common law has continued…. Because federal courts confront common law 
issues, they contribute to the development of the common law, and state courts may draw upon their rulings 
in enunciating common law principles.” 
14 See the discussion infra parts II and III. 
15 See the discussion infra parts II and III. 
7playing a far more prominent role in the process of reforming commercial law than either 
the state courts or the state legislatures.  The third part illustrates the consequences by 
examining three prominent areas of controversy in modern sales law that have arisen 
from the federal courts’ exercise of their judicial discretion.  As the discussion elaborates, 
the federal courts have been at the heart of debates about computer software and the 
scope of Article 2, the rules governing the formation of sales contracts, and the 
consequences of the failure of limited remedy clauses.  The final section concludes. 
 
I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF JUDICAL-FEDERALISM 
Erie was a pivotal case.  It shifted the fault lines in the American system of 
judicial federalism and stymied a burgeoning body of federal common law,16 which was 
already beginning to spawn an unwholesome degree of forum shopping by the early 
twentieth century.17 The Supreme Court has subsequently worked out an important body 
of jurisprudence governing the appropriate choice between federal and state rules in 
federal diversity cases and state cases arising under federal law.  It is now clear that 
federal courts are supposed to apply state statutes and precedents when answering 
 
16 This is not to deny that the federal courts still create federal common law through their interpretations of 
federal statutes or that they still play an important role in interpreting state law.  See Weinberg, supra note 
11 and Nelson, supra note 11 for an overview of federal common law in the post-Erie era. 
17 This was cited by the Court in Erie. As Justice Brandeis wrote, “Swift v. Tyson introduced grave 
discrimination by non-citizens against citizens.  It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law” 
vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or the federal court; and the privilege of 
selecting the court in which the right should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen….The 
discrimination resulting became in practice far-reaching.”  Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75. 
8questions that arise under state law and state courts must follow federal statutes and 
precedents when answering questions that arise under federal law.18 There are, in 
addition, sophisticated tests for making the appropriate choices of law when procedural 
questions bear on substantive legal outcomes.19 
18 IRWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 266-67 (1989) has summarized the Court’s 
jurisprudence as follows: “if state and federal law are inconsistent, the following questions must be asked.  
First, is there a valid federal statute or Federal Rule of procedure on point….If so, then the federal law is to 
be applied, even if there is a conflicting state law.  If there is not a valid [Federal] statute or Rule of 
procedure, the second question is whether the application of the state law in question is likely to be 
determinative of the outcome of the lawsuit.  If the state law is not outcome determinative, then federal law 
is used.  But if the state law is deemed to be outcome determinative, then the third question is asked: is 
there an overriding federal interest justifying the application of federal law?” 
19 In addition to Erie, the Court has developed a series of tests to answer complicated questions that arise 
when federal courts must decide whether to follow federal or state procedures in diversity cases.  In an 
early case, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (in diversity cases the outcome of the litigation 
should be substantially the same as if tried in a state court), the Court proposed an “outcome-determinative” 
test.  In subsequent cases, especially Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525 (1958) 
(if the state practice is bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties a federal 
court should follow state practice; if not, a federal court may follow federal practice if there are affirmative 
countervailing considerations of federal judicial administration), and Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965) (in the absence of a federal rule or statute, a federal court should follow the state practice if 
following the federal practice would lead to forum-shopping or inequitable administration of the laws), the 
Court has modified Guaranty Trust and developed a multilayered approach that inquires first into the 
existence of relevant federal procedural rules and then applies a modified outcome-terminative test.  For a 
summary, see Id. 
9The case law since Erie has thus constructed a framework within which 
fundamental questions about the roles of the federal and state courts can be answered.  In 
spite of all the nuances of this sophisticated jurisprudential edifice, however, there is still 
a gaping crack in its foundations.  If a state court incorrectly applies federal law the 
losing party can in theory appeal the decision all the way to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and the Supreme Court therefore has ultimate authority over all questions 
arising under federal law; if a federal court incorrectly applies state law in a diversity 
case, however, the losing party has no right of appeal to the state supreme court, and the 
state supreme courts do not, therefore, have ultimate authority over all questions arising 
under state law.20 Of course, the federal courts are obliged to follow state statutes and 
precedents, and if novel questions arising under state law come before them they are 
supposed to predict how the state supreme court would respond.21 Moreover, some states 
 
20 The state courts might have the opportunity to overrule a federal holding on a question of state law if the 
same question happens to subsequently come before them.  Although that has happened, it is far from likely 
and will not necessarily result in a reopening of the case.  It did result in a reopening of the case in Pierce v. 
Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975) (for a discussion, see Note, Pierce v. Cook: Rule 60(b)(6) Relief 
from Judgment for Change of State Law in a Diversity Case, 62 VA. L. REV. 414 (1976) and Note, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): Standards for Relief from Judgments Due to Changes in Law, 43 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 646 (1976), but in some other cases, such as DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994) it 
did not.  Some states allow federal courts to certify questions of state law to the state supreme court for an 
answer, but this procedure is not always available and there is no requirement that the federal courts must 
take advantage of it even if it is.  For a discussion, see STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
288-92 (1996). 
21 The Supreme Court has held that a federal court may not decline to hear a case simply because of 
uncertainty as to the relevant state law.  Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236, 238 (1943).  In 
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allow federal courts to certify questions to the state supreme court for definitive 
interpretations of state law.22 But in practice, the imbalance has given the federal courts 
degrees of freedom in interpreting state law that the state courts do not have in 
interpreting federal law.23 This has had especially significant consequences for recent 
developments in commercial law, and lies at the heart of the controversy over recent 
attempts to amend Article 2 of the UCC. 
It is easy to forget that Swift v. Tyson was a commercial law case.  Under the 
doctrine the Supreme Court established in Swift, the federal courts sought to achieve 
uniformity in commercial law through holdings that looked beyond the narrow 
provincialism of any one state’s laws.24 In this regard, their decisions reflected the 
 
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1965) the Court stated that “If there be no decision 
by [the state supreme court] then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after 
giving proper regard to relevant rulings of other courts in the state.  In this respect, it may be said to be, in 
effect, sitting as a state court.”  This peculiar arrangement invited the following quip by Judge Friendly in 
Nolan v. Transocean Air Lanes, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960)), a case that raised a difficult question 
about the choice of state law in a federal diversity case:  “Our principal task is to determine what the New 
York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought.” 
22 About half the states allow certification.  For a discussion, see PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 307 (1994). 
23 The losing party in a federal diversity case could always appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds that 
the federal court’s interpretation of state law violated Erie, but the Supreme Court would be extremely 
unlikely to grant a writ of certiorari in such a case. 
24 In Swift, the Court held that the section of the Judiciary Act that directed the federal courts to look to “the 
laws of the several states” for legal authorities in diversity cases was meant to be “strictly limited to local 
statutes and local usages” and that it did not extend to “contracts and other instruments of a commercial 
nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought not in the decisions of the local tribunals, 
11
dominant jurisprudential tradition of the time.  Under the theory of natural law that 
prevailed during the antebellum period, certain legal principles were thought to transcend 
jurisdictional boundaries and provide rules of law common to all courts in all 
jurisdictions.25 This was especially true in the area of commercial law, which was 
thought to be rooted in the ancient law of the merchant and governed by usage of trade 
and underlying principles of commerce.26 In appealing to these broader authorities, 
federal judges simply believed they were constructing their interpretations of the law 
correctly, rather than devising a separate body of federal commercial law.27 Indeed, there 
was an understanding of the great value of uniformity in commercial laws implicit in 
their appeal to these broader principles.28 When federal courts rendered holdings that 
 
but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence”  Swift, 41 U.S at 19.  The doctrine 
was subsequently extended to questions in tort in Baltimore & Ohio RR. V. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893) 
and to questions in property in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910) but it is significant that it 
arose out of a case in commercial law. 
25 The medieval conception of natural law, which was based on the “premise that any positive law that 
violated natural law was void,” had long since been marginalized.  MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 156 1870-1960.  In the Classical legal jurisprudence that 
emerged in the nineteenth century “natural rights discourse structured legal argument by suggesting starting 
points, background assumptions, presumptions, or first principles in the law.”  Id. at 158.   
26 The great British jurist, Lord Mansfield attempted to institutionalize the reference to mercantile custom 
by relying on a jury of merchants.  HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW, 160-175 
(1938).  According to Karl Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV.L.REV. 725 (1939), 
however, the law of sales never fully incorporated mercantile custom.  
27 As Weinberg, supra note 11 at 824 put it, in Swift Justice Story “was aiming for uniform commercial law 
– and better commercial law than he found under the …common law of New York.” 
28 Id. 
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rejected or ignored state court holdings they were trying to achieve legal unification 
through the development of a system of “general commercial law” that cohered with the 
underlying principles of commercial transactions.29 
Federal court holdings on state questions that clearly diverged from state 
authorities were not, however, consistent with twentieth century theories of democracy 
and judicial restraint.30 Indeed, the current imbalance in judicial federalism is also 
inconsistent with fundamental principles of democracy and judicial restraint, since it 
allows federal courts to render holdings on state questions that are not subject to a right of 
appeal to the state supreme courts.  This places them beyond the system of checks and 
balances that normally helps to ensure judicial accountability and restrain the scope of 
judicial discretion in a constitutional democracy.31 The federal courts have exercised 
 
29 Justice Story, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Swift, had earlier been an advocate of legal codification 
in Massachusetts.  See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common–Law World 25 
YALE J.INT.L 435 (2000).  In Swift, 41 U.S. at 18 Story held that federal courts could declare rules for 
“general commercial law” in a manner consistent with Lord Manfield’s dictum that commercial law is “not 
the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.”  As Weinberg, supra note 11 at 824 
observed, “Story hoped …that uniformity would follow.” 
30 As Justice Brandeis noted in Erie, 304 U.S. at 72,  “The federal courts [under Swift] assumed, in the 
broad field of general law, the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without 
power to enact as statutes.”  At least until some time in the twentieth century, it was clear that the federal 
government’s commerce powers did not extend to all commercial activities.  Nonetheless, Swift authorized 
the federal courts to create general commercial law without regard to the scope of federal commerce 
powers.  This was the unconstitutional course of conduct authorized by Swift to which Brandeis alluded in 
Erie. Id. at 77-78. 
31 See the discussion infra, section II.
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their discretion quite freely, particularly in interpreting Article 2.32 While this has 
promoted experimentation and innovation in the law and militated against legal 
obsolescence, it has also begun to undermine the uniformity of American sales law.33 
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE SCOPE OF 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
 
A.  Comparative Institutional Analysis 
In any constitutional democracy some degree of discretion must be accorded to 
the judiciary.  There can be no rule of law unless the courts have the authority to interpret 
statutes and precedents free from the control of political officials.34 Yet if the courts were 
 
32 See the discussion infra, in section III. 
33 Justice Brandeis cited the failure of the Swift doctrine to achieve uniformity in Erie 304 U.S. at 74: 
“Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented uniformity; and 
the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and 
that of local law developed a new well of uncertainties.”  Indeed, divergent judicial decisions have 
frustrated the objectives of commercial codification since the turn-of-the-twentieth century.  See WALTER 
P. ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 50 (991).  The argument below 
suggests, however, that the inordinate discretion of the federal courts on questions of state law has created 
very particular problems for the development of sales law. 
34 See ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 211-39, 365-367 (2000) for an 
overview.  As Cooter notes, the system of justice in a dictatorship, such as the former Soviet Union, has 
been referred to as “telephone justice,” presumably to invoke the metaphor of the executive telephoning a 
judge to direct her disposition of a case.  Id. 
14
granted complete autonomy to interpret the laws without any checks against their 
exercise of discretion or any system of judicial accountability, they could fashion the 
laws without regard to the will of the electorate, and the rule of law could become little 
more than a façade for totalitarianism.35 The framers of the U.S. Constitution thought 
very carefully about the role of the judiciary as well as the legislative and executive 
branches of government, and sought to restrain the power of each through a well-defined 
system of checks and balances.36 Indeed, the system of government the framers devised 
was a creative and original response to the potential pitfalls in a republican form of 
 
35 In a true theocracy, for instance, there is no separation of powers and all branches of government are 
subordinate to the law of the prevailing religion.  A theocracy may, therefore, veer towards a kind of 
totalitarianism in which the people are subordinate to the legal dictates of their religious leaders.   Indeed, 
MANFRED HALPERN, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA 134-155 ((1963) coined the term “neo-Islamic totalitarianism” to refer to the Muslim 
fundamentalist forces at play in the Middle East over forty years ago.  That characterization has been 
challenged (see e.g. Michael Whine, Islamimism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences, 2
TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL RELIGIONS 54 (2001)) but, in light of recent 
experience in the Middle East, particularly in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, the analogy remains 
highly relevant. 
36 William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 
J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) argue that an independent and neutral judiciary is essential to enforcing the 
bargains between competing interests in the democratic process.  From the perspective offered here, it is 
naive to think that the judiciary can be truly independent and neutral.  Indeed, the separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches inevitably confers political power on the judiciary.  As long 
as the judicial appointment process is subject to political control, therefore, it will be impossible for the 
judiciary to remain truly independent and neutral. 
15
government.  In that regard, the U.S. Constitution was an experiment in democracy as 
well as the product of political theory and compromise.37 
The U.S. Constitution thus provides a useful model for understanding the role of 
the judiciary in a constitutional democracy.  The framers invested legislative powers in 
the Congress, but divided them between the House of Representatives and the Senate.38 
Moreover, the President was given the power to veto new legislation, subject to a two 
thirds majority override;39 this veto provision confers some de facto legislative power on 
the executive branch of government as well as the legislature.  Any new legislation 
requires a bargain -- a bargain between both Houses of Congress as well as the 
 
37 The actual history of the Constitutional convention reminds one of the old quip about sausages – “better 
eaten than seen in the making” – but the outcome was a remarkably intricate and novel legal document, 
whether by design, happenstance, or something in between.  Some popular histories may overemphasize 
the wisdom of the drafters (see e.g. CAROL BERKIN, A BRILLIANT SOLUTION: INVENTING THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2003), CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT 
PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY – SEPTEMBER 
1987 (1986), or CHARLES L. MEE, THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE (1987)), but this should not detract 
from the unique character of the constitutional structure they devised.   
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-7.  As Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than 
One? 12 INT.REV.LAW & ECON. 145-62 (1992) argues, the separation of legislative powers between an 
upper and lower house also has important implications for the relative powers of the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches.  A separation of legislative powers between two houses in a bicameral legislature 
increases the difficulty of a legislative bargain; it thus also makes it less likely that the legislature will be 
able to override any veto of new legislation by the executive branch, or that it will be able to enact a 
statutory amendment to overrule judicial interpretations of the law that depart from legislative intent.  
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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President.40 At least fifty percent of the members of each of the two houses of the 
legislature must agree to the bargain as well as the President; if the President refuses to 
participate in the bargain and vetoes the new legislation then a bargain between two 
thirds of the members of the two houses is necessary to override the veto and enact the 
new legislation.  This separation of powers ensures that all new legislation will have a 
broad base of political support.41 It also means that new legislation is difficult to enact, 
and that the American system of government tends to favor the status quo. 
The American system of government favors the status quo not only because the 
U.S. Constitution requires so much legislative bargaining to enact any new proposals but 
also because legislative bargaining is costly.42 The political parties’ control of the House 
and Senate is not strong enough to ensure that members will vote along party lines and so 
legislators’ votes often have to be “bought” with promises of support for the legislators’ 
own favored initiatives, important committee assignments, or a myriad of other favors, 
 
40 The discussion here draws on the bargaining model presented by COOTER, supra note 34 at 211-39. 
41 Of course, the broad base of political support might derive in large measure from bargains among the 
legislators.  Lobby groups and special interests will often succeed in having special interest legislation 
enacted, but usually as part of some omnibus bill.  In fact, the possibility of enacting special interest 
legislation in such a manner increases the potential scope of legislative bargains.  If a coalition of 
legislators is too small to force a bill through the legislature, they might be able to “buy” other legislators’ 
support by promising to attach special interest legislation that provides specific benefits to the other 
legislators’ constituency (e.g. funding for a new bridge or a new research institute).  This kind of “pork 
barrel politics” is often the subject of derision, but, ironically, it can help to facilitate the enactment of other 
socially desirable legislation.  Of course, if the entire legislative process is dominated by special interests, 
there is little hope that the outcomes will serve the public welfare.  Id. 
42 Id. 
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both small and large.43 The transactions required to gain legislative support for any new 
proposal will usually consume a significant amount of the legislators’ scarce time and 
energy.  These transaction costs may well preclude many potentially gainful bargains and 
inhibit legislative enactments.  In general, the higher the transaction costs of legislative 
bargaining, the more the legislative process favors the status quo 
The separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, and the 
transaction costs of legislative bargaining, have an implicit effect on the powers of the 
judiciary.  The scope of judicial discretion is ultimately constrained in two ways:  first, by 
the power of the executive and legislative branches to overrule controversial judicial 
holdings by enacting new legislation, and second, by the powers of the executive and 
legislative branches over judicial appointments.44 Since the U.S. Constitution separates 
the power to enact new legislation so widely, the political bargains necessary to overrule 
the courts will be difficult to achieve.  American courts thus generally have a wide range 
of discretion to interpret the federal laws -- a much wider range of discretion than the 
courts in many other countries.45 Indeed, not all constitutions require so much bargaining 
to enact new legislation.  In the British political system, for instance, the executive (the 
prime minister) is the member of the legislature (parliament) who has the support of a 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 225-34. 
45 See Robert Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Division of Powers in the European Constitution in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, (John Eatwell et al. eds. 1998) and Mark J. Ramseyer 
& Eric Rasmussen, Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan, American Law 
and Economics Association Annual Meeting (1996). 
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majority of its members.46 There is no separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative branches, and thus new legislation does not require as difficult and costly a 
bargain as in the U.S.  In general, therefore, British courts can be overruled more easily 
than American courts and the British political system does not confer as much discretion 
on the courts as the American political system.47 
The wide scope of judicial discretion in the U.S. has made the judicial 
appointment process (at the federal level, at least) much more political than in Great 
Britain and Europe.48 Indeed, in keeping with the theory of checks and balances upon 
which the U.S. Constitution was based, the framers also separated the power over federal 
judicial appointments between the executive and legislative branches.  The President was 
given the power to nominate federal judges and justices and the Senate was given the 
power of advice and consent.49 Of course, the rules governing the tenure and terms of 
appointment for judges, the circumstances under which they can be impeached, and the 
 
46 For an overview of the British political system, see JOHN KINGDOM, GOVERNMENT AND 
POLITICS IN BRITAIN: AN INTRODUCTION (2003). 
47 COOTER, supra note 34 at 229.  Indeed, the scope of judicial discretion in the U.S. is manifest most 
evidently in matters of constitutional law.  The U.S. Constitution requires a much more difficult and costly 
bargain to amend the Constitution than to enact new federal legislation.  U.S. CONST. art. 5.  This 
fragmentation of the power to amend the Constitution has significantly enhanced the discretion of the 
Supreme Court in matters of constitutional interpretation.  As a result, appointments to the Supreme Court 
have become highly politicized.  See John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 41 (2002) for an analysis of the relationship between political fragmentation and 
judicial power. 
48 Ferejohn, supra note 47 at 64-65. 
49 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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assignment of the powers of reappointment are also important to the restraint of judicial 
discretion.50 Although the U.S. Constitution confers lifetime tenure on justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States,51 the terms of appointment for federal judges is left 
to the discretion of Congress (subject, of course, to the President’s veto power).52 
As long as the judicial branch is truly independent, the judiciary will come to 
exercise some degree of discretion in any constitutional democracy.53 If the power to 
enact new legislation is separated very widely and if there are no limits on the tenure and 
terms of appointment of judges and justices, the judiciary will tend to have a wide range 
of discretion.54 It will be able to exercise this discretion to interpret the laws in ways that 
the executive and legislative branches did not intend and are therefore not in accord with 
democratic principles, narrowly conceived.55 It will also be able to exercise its discretion 
to break the law free of the status quo.  In this regard, the separation of powers allows the 
 
50 If a judge is subject to periodic reappointment, or impeachment for abuse of discretion, she may be 
inhibited from interpreting statutes in ways that were clearly not intended and might therefore offend the 
executive and legislative branches or draw public attention and criticism.  If her tenure is short, she may 
quickly be replaced with a judge who exercises less discretion. 
51 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
52 Id. 
53 This is essentially a summary of COOTER, supra note 34. 
54 Id. 
55 One could argue, of course, that some judicial discretion is essential in any true constitutional democracy 
and that its exercise is not necessarily contrary to democratic principles, except perhaps in the narrowest 
sense. 
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judicial branch to serve as a source of legal innovation and experimentation, and offer an 
important check against legal obsolescence.56 
Guido Calabresi has used the term “legal obsolescence” to characterize the 
problem that arises when a statute is ill-fitted to modern circumstances and lacks 
legislative support.57 He argues that obsolescent statutes often cannot be revised or 
repealed, presumably because of the difficulties of achieving the legislative bargain that 
would be necessary to enact new legislation.  Most interestingly, Calabresi argues that the 
exercise of judicial discretion can help to alleviate the problem.  From his perspective, the 
wide separation of legislative powers and the transaction costs of legislative bargaining 
not only cause legal obsolescence, they also confer discretion on the judiciary that the 
judiciary can – and should – use to militate against the legal obsolescence.  It is difficult 
to dispute his claim that the wise use of judicial discretion over the interpretation of 
 
56 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982). 
57 As Calabresi explains, 
There is an alternate way of dealing with the problem of legal obsolescence: granting 
courts the authority to determine whether a statue is obsolete, whether in one way or 
another it should be consciously reviewed.  At times, this doctrine would approach 
granting to courts the authority to treat statutes as if they were no more and no less than 
part of the common law.  At other times, it would be used to enable courts to encourage, 
or even to induce, legislative reconsideration of the statute….The object in all cases 
would be to permit courts to keep anachronistic laws from governing us without thereby 
requiring them to do tasks for which they are not suited, or denying to the legislatures the 
decisive word in the making of constitutionally valid laws. 
Id. 
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obsolete statutes could increase social welfare.  Of course, it is easy to imagine how the 
ill-advised use of that discretion could be socially detrimental. 
The U.S. Constitution constrains the federal government from using the terms of 
appointment for Supreme Court justices to limit the scope of discretion exercised by the 
Supreme Court,58 and Congress has not used its control over the terms of appointment for 
federal judges to limit the discretion of the lower federal courts either.59 The scope of the 
state courts’ judicial discretion depends largely, of course, on the separation of powers in 
the state constitutions and the transaction costs of bargaining within the state political 
systems.  Although most states’ constitutions separate the power to enact new legislation 
in a manner similar to the U.S. Constitution, the states generally limit the tenure of state 
supreme court justices60 as well as state judges,61 and so control over appointment and 
tenure is a much more important check against the exercise of judicial discretion at the 
state level than the federal level.  Since many state judges and justices are elected, this 
control is often exercised by state voters.62 
The state constitutions and governments therefore typically exercise more 
restraint over state judiciaries than the federal Constitution and government exercise over 
 
58 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
59 Federal judges are appointed for life as long as they exhibit good behavior.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(b), 
134(a). 
60 See TARR & PORTER, supra note 13 at 64, and F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions 
on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 
J.LEG.STUD. 205, 213 (1999). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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the federal judiciary.  Moreover, the relatively high transaction costs of political 
bargaining at the federal level, on both constitutional and legislative matters, probably 
allows the federal judiciary to exercise more discretion on federal legal questions than the 
state judiciaries can exercise on state legal questions.63 Of course, if state courts 
misapply federal law they can always be overruled by the Supreme Court, and so this also 
constrains the state courts’ exercise of discretion on questions of federal law.  But there is 
no similar constraint on the federal courts’ exercise of their discretion over questions of 
state law.  In practice, the federal courts’ discretion over questions of state law is virtually 
unchecked by any system of accountability to elected officials -- state or federal.  Of 
course, the state legislatures have the power to overrule errant federal court 
interpretations of state statutes, but on questions of commercial law, where the states 
have subordinated their usual legislative autonomy to a uniform law-making process even 
this check against the federal judicial power is virtually ineffective. 
 
B. The Uniform Law-Making Process and the Inordinate 
Discretion of the Federal Courts 
The peculiar history of uniform law-making in the U.S. has resulted in the federal 
courts having more discretion over the interpretation of the commercial laws than the 
state courts.  The U.S. Constitution confers authority over interstate commerce on the 
federal government,64 but otherwise leaves matters of contract, property, torts, and crime 
 
63 Since federal legislators represent much more diverse regions and interests than state legislators, the 
transaction costs of bargaining among them is generally higher.  See COOTER, supra note 34. 
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
23
to the states.65 Commercial law has thus traditionally been within the states’ sphere of 
authority.  This was a workable arrangement in the eighteenth and even into the 
nineteenth centuries, before the canals and railroads created a truly national market, but 
by the late nineteenth century, as the mass-production manufacturing industries emerged 
in the wake of the transportation revolution that allowed firms to sell their products in 
distant states,66 the pressures to unify the law of commerce across the states became 
much more intense.67 It was not at all clear, however, whether the interstate commerce 
powers of the federal government were broad enough to justify commercial codification 
and unification through federal legislation; most late nineteenth century business and 
 
65 The U.S. Constitution does not specifically grant “police powers” to the states, but the Tenth Amendment 
reserves powers not specially granted to the federal government for the states.  Thus, police powers – those 
concerning health, morals, and well-being – have traditionally been construed as within the states’ sphere 
of authority.  See e.g. Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding a federal law that restricted 
interstate shipments of goods produced using child labor unconstitutional). 
66 For overviews of these developments see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE 
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977), DAVID C. MOWERY & 
NATHAN ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1989), 
and ALFRED D. CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THYE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
CAPTIALISM (1990). 
67 The American Bar Association, which was instrumental in establishing the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, first formed a Committee on Uniform Laws in 1891.  
ARMSTRONG, supra note 32 at 20.  See also Weiss, supra note 29 and Kevin M. Teeven, A History of 
Legislative Reform of the Common Law of Contract, 26 U.TOL.L.REV. 35 (1994).  
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political leaders believed they were not.68 Regardless, there were significant political 
impediments to federalizing commercial law throughout the twentieth century.69 
The initial impetus to unify the commercial laws manifested itself through the 
newly-formed American Bar Association (ABA).  In 1881 the Alabama Bar Association 
created a committee to make recommendations about legal unification and to advance the 
 
68 The Supreme Court may have expanded the scope of federal commerce powers in Swift & Co. v. United  
States 196 U.S. 375 (1905) enough to bring much commercial activity within the scope of the federal 
government, but many observers clearly believed that the power to regulate commerce was reserved for the 
states well into the twentieth century.  In a New York Times article in 1910, for instance, Seth Low 
suggested that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to confer power over commercial law on the 
federal government: “Under our federal system we can obtain uniformity of statutory law in only one of 
two ways.  We can give, by constitutional amendment, additional power to Congress: or we must develop 
the capacity and the habit in the separate states of acting together.”  Uniform State laws Advocated by Taft, 
N.Y.TIMES. Jan. 18, 1910, at 8. 
69 The resistance to federal encroachment on areas of traditional state authority, often manifested in the 
rhetoric of “states’ rights,” drew much of its vigor from white racists’ attempts to suppress blacks’ civil 
rights well into the twentieth century.  See V.O. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS (1949).  As Lynn A. Baker 
& Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 143-144 
(2001) observed, “the notion of states’ rights today continues to suffer mightily under the weight of [this] 
association.”  But the assertion of states’ rights has also tended to serve other political interests.  As 
HARMON ZIEGLER, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 46-47 (1964) noted, business 
interests often find they are relatively more influential with state governments than the federal 
governments.  Indeed, according to DONALD C. BLAISDELL, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY UNDER 
PRESSURE 48 (1957) “federalism does not involve a struggle between the nation and the states, but rather 
a struggle among interests who have favorable access to one of the two levels of government.” 
25
cause in other states.70 Then in 1889 L.D. McFarland, the president of the Tennessee Bar 
Association, advocated a process for achieving legal unification across the states in his 
annual address.71 McFarland’s address led to the establishment of a committee which 
advanced the issue at the ABA’s annual meeting in Chicago in 1889.72 The president of 
the ABA at the time was David Dudley Field, who had already drafted the “Field Code” 
and was a strong advocate of legal codification.73 He appointed a special committee to 
investigate the matter further.74 Although attendance at the special committee meetings 
was poor, the committee submitted a report to the ABA which recommended that the 
ABA request its members to prepare bills for passage in their state legislatures which 
would provide for the appointment of commissioners to advance the uniformity of state 
laws.75 
In 1890, the ABA adopted a resolution which accepted the committee’s 
recommendations and led to the establishment of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).76 The NCCUSL’s mandate was to 
further the codification and unification of laws across the states by sponsoring the 
 
70 ARMSTRONG, supra note 33 at 17-18. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Weiss, supra note 29.   
74 ARMSTRONG, supra note 33 at 18. 
75 Id. at 18-19. 
76 Id. Not all states rushed to appoint Commissioners; indeed, some states had not yet appointed any by the 
turn of the century.  The NCCUSL nonetheless was able to proceed with its business.  Id. 
26
drafting of model legal codes and encouraging state legislatures to adopt them.77 It 
initially sponsored a series of model commercial codes, many of which were drafted by 
legal academics, including the Uniform Sales Act, which was drafted by Karl 
Llewellyn.78 The NCCUSL process, however, was one which left formal authority over 
commercial laws in the state governments, and few of the model commercial codes were 
widely adopted as drafted.79 Moreover, the objectives of legal unification appeared to be 
frustrated from early on by divergent judicial interpretations of the uniform statutes.80 
The NCCUSL initially sought to enhance uniformity in the judicial interpretations 
of its bills by including within them provisions which mandated uniformity in 
interpretation.81 The problem persisted, however, and in 1929 the NCCUSL published a 
report on the various judicial decisions interpreting the Negotiable Instruments Law, 
which had been one of its most widely adopted uniform model codes, in which it 
observed that “The whole fabric, the very conception of uniformity, was being menaced 
 
77 The NCCUSL is funded primarily from state appropriations, but also from the ABA as well as various 
foundations, interest groups, and federal agencies.  Id. at 89. 
78 N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute,
8 LAW & HIST. REV. 55 (1990). 
79 ARMSTRONG, supra note 33 at 50. 
80 In his annual address as NCCUSL president in 1914 Charles T. Terry stated that “there has been as 
pronounced a tendency to divergence in the decisions of the courts as there has been in the enactment of 
statutes in the respective states.  This has not been a conscious tendency, …but it has been none the less 
alarming.  It has been a menace to the accomplishment of our purpose, of such grave proportions, as to 
convince us that the attainment of our end would be jeopardized, unless some means could be found to 
mitigate or check the tendency.”  Id.
81 Id. at 51. 
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by the strange attitude of the courts….[T]he courts, on identical statutes, were reaching 
diametrically opposite conclusions; cases from other states on the precise point were 
being ignored; the very statute was ofttimes neglected…”.82 Although this was well 
before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Erie, it might just as easily have 
been stated in a much more recent report.83 
The early attempts at commercial codification were thus a mixed success at best.84 
Well before the middle of the twentieth century, however, a series of Supreme Court 
opinions had made it clear that the federal government’s commerce powers were 
sufficient for commercial codification to proceed through federal legislation.85 Some 
influential lawyers and academics began to advocate unification of sales law through 
 
82 Id. at 51-52. 
83 The Supreme Court acknowledged the challenge that divergent interpretations posed to commercial 
uniformity well before Erie: in Commercial National Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank and 
Trust Company 239 U.S 520, 528 (1916), Justice Hughes wrote that “It is apparent that if the uniform acts 
are construed in the several states adopting them according to former local views upon analogous subjects, 
we shall miss the desired uniformity, and we shall erect upon the foundation of uniform language separate 
legal structures as distinct as were the former varying laws.” 
84 ARMSTRONG, supra note 33 at 50. 
85 The Supreme Court adopted the stream of commerce doctrine in Swift & Co., 196 U.S. at 398-399.  
According to David Gordon, Swift & Co. v. United States: The Beef Trust and the Stream of Commerce 
Doctrine, 28 AM.J.LEGAL HIST. 244, 279 (1984), this “laid the foundation for much of twentieth century 
history.”  It was not immediately clear that Swift & Co. expanded the scope of federal commerce powers 
enough for the federal government to enact commercial laws, but the Supreme Court subsequently upheld 
federal legislation in what had traditionally been state areas of authority in a number of other cases (see e.g. 
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1 (1937)) 
and this eventually became clear. 
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federal legislation.86 In 1922 the ABA drew on Samuel Williston’s talents to draft a 
federal sales bill.87 Although this was never enacted, powerful interests groups such as 
the Merchant’s Association of New York continued to lobby for federal action.88 Some 
prominent academics, such as Karl Llewellyn, also advocated unification through federal 
legislation.89 William A. Schneider, the president of the NCCUSL at the time, however, 
was a states’ rights advocate, and he urged further attempts at unification through the 
NCCUSL process.90 The NCCUSL, this time in conjunction with the American Law 
Institute (ALI), subsequently initiated the Uniform Commercial Code project.91 The 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was subsequently adopted by all states, and became 
the first (and only) true success of the NCCUSL-ALI law-making process.92 Proponents 
of states’ rights, who had often resisted codification through the NCCUSL process, were 
finally forced to concede to commercial codification out of a fear that, if they 
 
86 ARMSTRONG, supra note 33 at 95. 
87 Id. at 40. 
88 Id. at 95. 
89 Llewellyn, who had earlier drafted the Uniform Sales Act, was by this time skeptical about the possibility 
of achieving uniform commercial laws through state legislation.  As he wrote, “To prepare amendments to 
the Uniform Sales Act is possible, and is desirable.  But merely to set those amendments on the road to 
adoption, State by State, is to throw new confusion into the field of interstate commerce.  After thirty-four 
years, we still have one or another variety of non-uniform common law in sixteen states….  The only 
practicable road to real uniformity is by Congressional action.”  Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal 
Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558, 561 (1939-40).  
90 ARMSTRONG, supra note 33 at 97. 
91 Id. For a detailed description of the NCCUSL-ALI drafting process, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4. 
92 ARMSTRONG, supra note 33 at 53. 
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successfully resisted further attempts through the NCCUSL-ALI process working at the 
state level, legislation would be enacted at the federal level, and the states would suffer a 
further erosion of their traditional spheres of authority.93 
The peculiar history of legal codification in the U.S. has resulted in a peculiar 
institutional framework for commercial law-making.  The states retain formal authority 
over commercial law, but de facto authority over commercial law amendments has been 
delegated to the NCCUSL-ALI law-making process.  This has worked well enough for 
most parts of the UCC, but not for Article 2.94 As the recent attempts to amend Article 2 
have shown, the wide range of interests at stake and the wide bargain required for any 
successful amendments, preclude the process from producing truly substantive changes.95 
93 In Armstrong’s view, Erie was also a key factor because it “erased the rickety framework of Federal 
common law which had served as a unifying factor for commercial law since 1842, causing the Merchant’s 
Association of New York City to press for Federal action in that field, avoidance of which ultimately 
resulted in the Uniform Commercial Code.”  Id. 
94 This is all in a relative manner of speaking.  Financial industry interests clearly dominate the amendment 
processes for Articles 3, 4, and 9.  See Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process and 
Scope, 42 ALA.L.REV. 405 (1991), Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the 
Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN.L.REV. 83, 121-23 
(1993), and Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4.  They also tend to be highly influential at the state legislatures.  
See ZIEGLER, supra note 69, BLAISDELL, supra note 69, and Ronald J. Hrebenar, Change, Transition, 
and Growth in Southern Interest Group Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN 
STATES 352, 338-339 (Ronald J. Hrebenar et al. eds., 1992).  This facilitates revisions to Articles 3, 4, and 
9 but possibly at the expense of consumer and other non-financial interests. 
95 As Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4 at 597, 645-648 observe, the recent amendments to Article 2 were 
produced by a study group that was dominated by reformers.  It thus tended to propose vague standards 
instead of bright line rules.  Schwartz and Scott correctly predicted that the process would fail. 
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The only amendments that can survive the bargaining process are the ones that are non-
controversial and there is thus little incentive for state legislatures to enact them.96 
Indeed, even if the NCCUSL-ALI process did produce meaningful amendments to 
Article 2, lobbying by interested business and consumer groups at the state level would 
probably impede many state legislatures from adopting them, and the uniformity of the 
code would be compromised anyway.97 The de facto power over the enactment of new 
sales legislation has been far too widely separated to permit an easy revision process. 
The diffuse power over the enactment of new sales legislation confers a wide 
range of discretion over the interpretation of Article 2 on both the federal and state 
courts.98 In practice, however, the range of discretion conferred upon the federal courts is 
much wider than that conferred upon the state courts.  Federal judges and justices are 
appointed by federal officials.  Barring any cause for impeachment, federal judges and 
justices may serve may serve indefinitely.99 Neither are subject to periodic review and 
reappointment.  Even if they were, they would be subject to reappointment by federal 
officials rather than state officials.  State judges and justices are often elected,100 and even 
 
96 Id. 
97 The states have certainly not rushed to adopt the recent amendments to Article 2, even though they are 
hardly as significant as many had hoped. 
98 As Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4 at 606 observe, the process does not empower the NCCUSL and ALI 
to overrule courts that interpret UCC provisions in ways the drafters did not intend.  The courts can only be 
overruled by higher courts within their own jurisdiction.  
99 J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling Independence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 
721, 728 (1994) describes the prevailing federal rule as “hands-off-the-courts.” 
100 SUSAN P. FINO, THE ROLE OF STATE SUPREME COURTS IN THE NEW JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM 20, 34 (1987). 
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if they are appointed by elected officials, they are usually only appointed for limited 
terms.101 They are therefore usually subject to replacement, reappointment, or reelection 
on a periodic basis.  Most importantly of all, they are subject to reappointment or 
reelection by state officials or state voters, not by federal officials.  In short, federal 
judges and justices are completely beyond the control of the individual states’ electorates; 
state judges and justices are not. 
Since federal court rulings on questions of state law cannot be appealed to state 
courts, and since neither elected state officials nor the states’ electorates have any control 
over the appointment or reappointment of federal judges and justices, the federal courts 
actually have a wider range of discretion over the interpretation of state law than the state 
courts.  This is a phenomenon associated with the exercise of the federal courts’ diversity 
jurisdiction generally.102 In the field of commercial law, however, and especially the sub-
field of sales law, the problem is much more acute.  The impossibility of a state court 
overruling a federal court’s interpretation of a state statute, and the difficulty of 
overruling federal interpretations of sales statutes through the NCCUSL-ALI process, 
together with the absence of any check on federal judicial discretion through periodic 
reappointment and/or renewal of federal judges, means that the federal courts have 
 
101 Id. at 59. 
102 TARR & PORTER, supra note 13 at 19-22.  As Tarr and Porter note, the federal courts remain 
important to the development of state common law generally: “because federal courts confront common 
law issues, they contribute to the development of the common law, and state courts may draw upon their 
rulings in enunciating common law principles.”  Id. 
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almost unbridled discretion in their rulings on any questions arising under Article 2.103 
Whether their autonomy is unwholesome is a matter open to debate.  On the one hand, it 
creates the potential for an exercise of judicial discretion that is inconsistent with modern 
notions of democracy and judicial restraint, but, on the other hand, it allows the federal 
courts to militate against the legislative obsolescence that otherwise tends to result from 
the strong bias in favor of the status quo that is inherent in the NCCUSL-ALI process. 
There is, in fact, a trade-off implicit in the role the federal courts currently play in 
the development of commercial law.  The wide discretion the federal courts enjoy in 
interpreting state commercial law statutes and their immunity from any oversight or 
control by the state electorate or elected state officials clearly raise questions about the 
role of the federal judiciary, yet, given the difficulty of revising Article 2 through the 
NCCUSL-ALI process and the inertia that would otherwise leave modern sales law in the 
grip of the status quo,104 the federal judiciary is also the most important source of 
innovation and experimentation in modern sales law.  It is clear that the most 
controversial interpretations of Article 2 within the last several years have been rendered 
by federal courts.105 In some cases federal courts appear to have consciously used their 
discretion in attempts to fashion new rules in accord with evolving commercial practices 
and standards rather than simply interpret the statutes as drafted.106 Ironically, they 
 
103 Of course, state courts are not bound by federal court rulings on questions of state law, and, in theory, a 
state court could have an opportunity to correct an errant federal ruling in a subsequent case.  But in 
practice, this is unlikely.  See the discussion supra note 20. 
104 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4 at 597. 
105 See the discussion infra part III. 
106 See the discussion infra part III. 
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appear to be acting out of similar motivations to those federal courts in the nineteenth 
century that, under the authority of Swift v. Tyson, disregarded state commercial law 
holdings and instead appealed to the broader principles and imperatives of commerce in 
attempts to fashion uniform rules of commercial law.107 
The peculiarities of the commercial law-making process in the United States in 
conjunction with the unique American system of judicial federalism thus place the federal 
courts in a unique and important position.  In some ways the role they play is similar to 
the role of traditional common law courts.  While many might contend that this is 
undemocratic, some scholars have argued that the common law process is not only more 
innovative but ultimately more efficient than the statutory law-making process that has 
largely replaced it.108 Whether the federal courts’ exercise of their discretion is for good 
or ill will ultimately depend on the consequences.  As the following discussion suggests, 
however, at this point it has only exacerbated the tendency toward contention and 
disunity in modern American sales law.  Moreover, in some cases the courts’ exercise of 
their discretion has been so bold that it challenges conventional notions about the role of 
the judiciary and the scope of federal judicial powers. 
 
107 See the discussion supra note 28. 
108 See, for instance, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW  397-427(1977), George 
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977), 
Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977), and Paul G. Mahoney, 
The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right, 30 J.LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001). 
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III. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND MODERN SALES LAW CONTROVERSIES 
 
A.  Computer Software and the Scope of the UCC 
One of the stumbling blocks in recent efforts to amend Article 2 has concerned its 
scope, specifically whether it should extend to transactions in computer software and 
other forms of computer information.109 The matter was the primary subject of a 
controversial ruling in 1991 by Judge Weis of the Third Circuit in Advent Systems 
Limited v. Unisys Corp.110 Advent Systems involved two corporate parties, the named 
principals in the case.  Unisys contracted with Advent to provide the software and related 
hardware for the document systems that Unisys was planning to sell with its computers in 
the US market.111 Under the terms of the contract Advent was also obligated to provide 
sales and marketing materials and assistance with the construction and installation of the 
document systems.112 The contract period was for two years with a provision for 
automatic renewal or termination by notice.113 Unisys, however, was restructuring and, 
perhaps as a consequence, decided that it wanted to develop its own document system.  It 
 
109 In the end, the drafters punted: the proposed revisions to Article 2 leave the scope of Article 2 to the 
case law.  As the preliminary official comment to 2-103(k) states, “When a transaction involves both the 
sale of goods and the transfer of rights in information, it is up to the courts to determine whether the 
transaction is entirely within or outside of this article, or whether or to what extent this article should be 
applied to a portion of the transaction.”  Proposed Revised U.C.C. § 2-103(k) cmt (2003). 
110 Advent Systems Limited v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
111 Id. at 672. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
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informed Advent that “their arrangement had ended.”114 Advent sued alleging breach of 
contract. 
At trial, the court applied Pennsylvania law, with the agreement of both parties.115 
The trial judge decided that Pennsylvania common law should apply to the contract rather 
than Article 2, and the jury found Unisys liable for damages of over $4m for breach of 
contract.116 Unisys appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in applying Pennsylvania 
common law rather than Article 2, that the contract was not enforceable against Unisys 
under the statute of frauds provision in UCC § 2-201 because the writing lacked a 
quantity term, and that, even if it was enforceable, the contract lacked sufficient 
definiteness upon which to base a remedy.117 Under Pennsylvania common law, the 
statute of frauds did not bar Advent from enforcing the contract, nor did Advent’s claim 
fail for lack of a reasonably certain basis for providing a remedy.  The case thus turned on 
the trial judge’s decision to apply the common law. 
Judge Weis began by invoking the predominant factor test, although he did not 
explicitly refer to it as such.118 He looked first to the language of the writing, and noted 
that it began with a statement that described Unisys’s objective under the agreement as 
being to “purchase” and Advent’s as being to “sell” certain of Advent’s hardware 
 
114 These are the words Judge Weis used to describe what was communicated.  Id.
115 The contract included a provision specifying that Pennsylvania law would apply.  That may have 
obviated the need for a difficult determination as to the choice of law.  Advent Systems is a British 
company and it was contracting with a British subsidiary of Unisys, an American company.  Id. at 673.   
116 Id. at 672. 
117 Id.
118 Id. at 674. 
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“products” and software licenses for “resale”.119 He noted that a subsequent heading 
described the subject matter of the transaction as a “sale” and that the section there-under 
also used the words “buy” and “sell” and “products” -- words which are all generally 
indicative of a contract for the sale of goods rather than a contract for services.120 He 
noted that Advent was supposed to invoice Unisys for each product purchased and for 
maintenance fees separately.121 The charge for Advent’s support services was to be 3% 
per annum of the list price of each software module sold by Unisys.122 Some additional 
services were to be provided at no cost.123 The relatively small share of the charges for 
services was also indicative of a sales contract. 
This would have been enough for the court to rule that the contract was one for 
the sale of goods rather than the supply of services, but Judge Weis proceeded to render a 
holding about the nature of software generally.  He characterized software as “the 
medium that stores input and output data as well as computer programs” where the 
medium is in the form of a hard disk, floppy disk, or magnetic tape.124 Judge Weis noted 
the voluminous academic commentaries on the nature of software and observed that most 
of it favored the view that software was a good within the meaning of the UCC § 2-
 
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. 
123 Id.
124 Id.
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102.125 Moreover, he noted that defining software as a good would bring transactions in 
software within the scope of Article 2 generally and that this would serve to unify the 
body of law applied to disputes arising from computer software transactions.126 In his 
view, this was a strong policy argument for including transactions in computer software 
within the scope of Article 2.  He therefore went beyond simply ruling that the contract in 
dispute was one for the sale of goods and held that “software is a good within the 
definition in the Code.”127 
It is far from obvious that Judge Weis was pleased with the implications of this 
holding for the case at hand.  The statute of frauds provision for Article 2 in UCC § 2-
201(1) clearly states that “A writing … is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond 
 
125 Id. at 675-676.  The Code is not particularly helpful.  U.C.C § 2-102 (2005) states that “this article 
applies to transactions in goods”, and U.C.C § 2-105(1) 2005 defines goods as “all things …which are 
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.”  Computer software itself is intangible, but it 
is usually encoded on some movable thing, such as a floppy disc or a computer hard drive.  Judge Weis 
may have been correct about the weight of the academic commentary at the time he wrote his opinion, but 
the weight has probably shifted seen then.  See the discussion infra notes 146 and 147.   
126 Id. at 676. 
127 Id. It is not clear how broadly Judge Weis meant for this holding to apply.  He had earlier noted that 
“Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process, but once implanted in a medium are widely 
distributed to computer owners.”  Id. at 675.  As he elaborated, “That a computer program may be 
copyrightable as intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in the form of a floppy disc or other 
medium, the program is tangible, moveable and available at the marketplace.”  Id.  It is plausible to 
interpret Judge Weis’ holding, therefore, to mean that computer software is a good when it is encoded on 
some kind of computer disc or hardware.  Indeed, some federal district courts in Pennsylvania have adopted 
this interpretation.  See the discussion infra note 150. 
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the quantity of goods shown in such writing.”128 This was an impediment to Advent in 
seeking enforcement of the contract because the writing executed between Advent and 
Unisys had no quantity term.  Of course, as Judge Weis noted, UCC § 2-201(1) states 
only that a contract under Article 2 is not enforceable beyond the quantity shown, not that 
a quantity must be shown for a contract to be enforceable.129 Although the plausibility of 
this interpretation has been acknowledged by some commentators,130 it has not been 
widely followed.131 Judge Weis therefore eschewed that approach in favor of another 
that drew an analogy between the contract between Advent and Unisys and an exclusive 
requirements contract.  Judge Weis reasoned that, although the contract between Advent 
and Unisys was nonexclusive, it was similar to an exclusive requirements contract in 
many ways.132 Since Article 2 does not require an output term in exclusive requirements 
contracts,133 Judge Weis held that an output term was not strictly required for Advent to 
enforce its contract with Unisys.134 
Judge Weis’ reasoning on this point was tenuous at best.  Although UCC § 2-306 
does not strictly require an output term in an exclusive requirements contract, that is 
 
128 U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2005). 
129 Advent Systems, 925 F.2d at 677. 
130 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-4, 81-82 (1988) and J. 
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19-34, 827 (1987). 
131 According to Judge Weis, “Courts have generally found that a quantity term must be stated…”.  Advent 
Systems, 925 F.2d at 677. 
132 Id.  at 678. 
133 See U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2005). 
134 Advent Systems, 925 F.2d 670 at 679. 
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clearly because the buyer’s requirements can be used as a good faith proxy.  Indeed, UCC 
§ 2-306(1) states that “A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or 
the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in 
good faith…”.135 The UCC thus makes it clear that the good faith requirements of the 
buyer in an exclusive requirements contract are to be treated as equivalent to a specific 
output term.  Since the contract is for the buyer’s exclusive requirements, there are no 
other suppliers to which the buyer can turn, and the buyer’s good faith requirements are a 
reasonable proxy for a specific output term.  The contract between Advent and Unisys, 
however, was not an exclusive requirements one.136 Hence, Unysis’ good faith 
requirements could not have been a reliable proxy for the contract’s output term since 
Unysis was apparently free to satisfy its requirements from other suppliers.  Judge Weis’ 
analogy between the contract in Advent Systems and an exclusive requirements contract 
stretches the scope of UCC § 2-306 well beyond anything the drafters could have 
intended. 
It also does an end run around the statute of frauds requirements in UCC § 2-
201.137 There is clearly some ambiguity about the wording of UCC § 2-201(1).  
Nonetheless, the comments to UCC § 2-201 seem to make it clear that UCC § 2-201(1) 
was meant to imply that a quantity term is required for a contract to be enforceable.  As 
official comment 1 notes, “The only term which must appear is the quantity term which 
 
135 U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2005). 
136 As Judge Weis noted, “the parties arrived at a non-exclusive requirements contract, a commercially 
useful device.”  Advent Systems, 925 F.2d 670 at 678. 
137 U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2005). 
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need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated.”138 And later, 
“Only three definite and invariable requirements as to the memorandum are made by this 
section…. third, it must specify a quantity.”139 The buyer’s good faith requirements in an 
exclusive requirements contract are, by the express provisions of UCC § 2-306(1), 
sufficient to satisfy the output requirement in UCC § 2-201(1).  But there is no statutory 
basis for holding that the buyer’s good faith output in a nonexclusive requirements 
contract is sufficient to satisfy the output requirement.  Judge Weis’ opinion is not 
consistent with a plain reading of the Code. 
Advent Systems faced yet another hurdle in its attempt to recover from Unisys in 
UCC § 2-204(3).140 UCC § 2-204(3) states that a contract does not fail for indefiniteness 
even though one or more terms are left open if “the parties have intended to make a 
contract and there is a reasonable certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”141 This 
suggests, of course, that a contract does fail if there is not a reasonably certain basis for 
giving an appropriate remedy.  With no output term in the contract, Advent could not 
easily prove its damages.  Judge Weis did not attempt to resolve the matter; instead, he 
remanded the case to the lower court for a determination as to whether the contract 
provided a reasonably certain basis for calculating Advent’s damages.142 He did, 
however, frame the inquiry for the trial court by suggesting that a sound basis for 
calculating damages might be found by estimating what Unisys’s good faith output 
 
138 U.C.C. § 2-201(1)  cmt 1 (2005). 
139 U.C.C. § 2-201(1) cmt 1 (2005). 
140 U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2005). 
141 U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2005). 
142 Advent Systems, 925 F.2d 670 at 680. 
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requirements would have been.143 Here again Judge Weis drew on an analogy to an 
exclusive requirements contract.  As official comment 2 to UCC § 2-306 states, “Under 
this section, a contract for output or requirements is not too indefinite since it is held to 
mean the actual good faith output or requirements of the particular party.”144 
The problem with this analogy, once again, is that the contract between Advent 
and Unisys was not an exclusive requirements one.  Hence, Unisys’s good faith output 
requirements could not serve as a reliable proxy for an output term and they did not 
provide a reasonably certain basis for calculating Advent’s damages.  One cannot help 
but suspect that Judge Weis points the district court in this direction to avoid the 
potentially harsh consequences for Advent of his holding that the contract was for the 
sale of goods rather than services.   
Advent was awarded damages at trial in a contest that was adjudicated under 
Pennsylvania common law.  Judge Weis overturned the trial court and held that Article 2 
applied to the case and indeed would apply to any case in which computer software was 
the predominant factor in the contract.  Yet Judge Weis’ sympathies clearly lay with 
Advent.  Unisys reneged on the deal and Advent was left in the lurch.  There is little 
doubt that Advent lost the benefit of a bargain.  But by holding that Article 2 applied to 
the case rather than the common law, Judge Weis exposed Advent to a potential bar to its 
enforcement of the contract from the statute of frauds.  Judge Weis’ creative 
interpretation of UCC § 2-201(1) prevented Advent from facing a strict bar to 
enforcement, but Advent was still exposed to the risk that its suit would fail for lack of a 
 
143 Id.
144 U.C.C. § 2-306(1) cmt 2 (2005). 
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reasonably certain basis for providing a remedy.  Judge Weis thus went to the trouble of 
suggesting to the trial court (and Advent) how the contract might be construed to provide 
a reasonably certain basis for calculating a remedy, again drawing on the dubious analogy 
with an exclusive requirements contract.  By all appearances, Judge Weis went to great 
lengths to help Advent out of the bind in which he put them by deciding the case under 
Article 2 instead of the common law. 
As Judge Weis made clear, his decision to apply Article 2 was driven by 
utilitarian calculations.145 Indeed, his calculations had less to do with the case at hand 
than with the scope of Article 2 generally.  He could easily have decided that, under the 
predominant factor test, the contract between Advent and Unysis was primarily for 
services rather than goods and simply upheld the district court.  And he could have held 
that the contract was primarily for goods and applied Article 2 without rendering an 
opinion about the nature of computer software in general.  But it would have been 
difficult for Judge Weis to hold that computer software is a good and that the contract 
between Advent and Unisys was primarily one for services.  Since Weis clearly wanted 
to extend the scope of Article 2 to computer software, he was forced to apply Article 2 to 
the contract as a consequence.  But since his sympathies in the case appeared to lie with 
Advent, he also fashioned an unusual justification for excluding the effect of the statute 
 
145 As he wrote, “Applying the U.C.C. to computer software transactions offers substantial benefits to 
litigants and the courts.  The Code offers a uniform body of law on a wide range of questions likely to arise 
in computer software disputes: implied warranties, consequential damages, disclaimers of liability, the 
statute of limitations, to name a few….The importance of software to the commercial world and the 
advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the U.C.C. are strong policy arguments favoring 
inclusion.”  Advent Systems, 925 F.2d 670 at 676. 
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of frauds and even suggested how the district court might construe a reasonable basis for 
calculating Advent’s damages in the absence of any reliable proxy for an output term.  
It is debatable whether Judge Weis’ efforts to bring transactions in computer 
software within the scope of Article 2 were to good effect.  In spite of Judge Weis’ 
utilitarian calculations, some commentators believe Article 2 is ill-suited to transactions 
in computer information.146 For one things, transactions in computer information usually 
only involve the transfer of a license, not a fee simple absolute.  This makes the warranty 
provisions of Article 2 somewhat inappropriate.147 Indeed, the NCCUSL and ALI 
approved the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) in 1999 
specifically for transactions involving the transfer of rights in computer information.148 
Although UCITA has not been widely adopted,149 it only exists because there was a 
widespread view that neither the common law nor Article 2 provides adequate 
governance mechanisms for computer information transactions.  At this point, Judge 
Weis’ holding in Advent Systems has not been widely followed,150 but if it is, it may 
simply force computer information transactions into a legal box they do not fit. 
 
146 See generally Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software, 38 DUQUESNE L. REV. 459, 
517 (1999). 
147 Id.  See also CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL 23 (1999). 
148 Brennan, supra note 146 at 461. 
149 According to the NCCUSL website, as of writing UCITA has been adopted only by Maryland and 
Virginia.  See http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp. 
150 It has been followed most notably by the Seventh Circuit in Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. v. Dharma 
Systems, Inc. 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998); it was cited favorably, but not strictly followed in Smart Online 
Inc. v. Opensite Technologies, Inc. 2003 NCBC 5 (NC Sup. Ct. 2003); it has been distinguished, however, 
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B.  Hill v. Gateway and the Rolling Contracts Controversy 
Few commercial law cases have raised as much controversy as Judge 
Easterbrook’s opinion in Hill v. Gateway.151 The case involved two consumers, Rich and 
Enza Hill, who ordered a personal computer from Gateway over the telephone.152 At the 
time of the telephone order, the Hills were apparently not given notice of any special 
contract terms or otherwise informed that the manner of contracting would differ from 
the norm in any way.153 The Hill’s computer arrived in a box, however, and the box 
included a writing which purported to list additional contract terms.154 One of the terms 
was an arbitration clause, which obliged the Hills to submit any disputes to arbitration if 
they retained possession of the computer for more than thirty days.155 The Hills did 
retain the computer for more than thirty days before complaining about some of its 
components and its performance.156 Gateway was unable or unwilling to address their 
complaints to their satisfaction and so they filed suit in a federal district court asserting 
claims under Illinois sales law. 
 
in a number of cases, including some heard in federal district courts in the Third Circuit – see, e.g., 
Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta Camera Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20743 (D.N.J. 1991) and Triple Point 
Technology, Inc. v. D.N.L. Risk Management, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22327 (D.N.J. 2000). 
151 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
152 Id. at 1148. 
153 This can be presumed from Judge Easterbrook’s description of the case.  Id. 
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At trial, Gateway asked the district judge to enforce the arbitration clause and 
dismiss the suit.157 The judge refused, and Gateway initiated an interlocutory appeal 
under 9 U.S.C. Section 16(a)(1)(A).158 The case thus came before Judge Easterbrook on 
the question of the validity of the arbitration clause.  Easterbrook vacated the district 
court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to compel the Hill’s to submit 
their case to arbitration.159 His disposition of the question has not only provided an 
important precedent for other courts to consider, it has also initiated an ongoing debate 
about merits of a new theory of contract formation -- the theory of “rolling contracts.”160 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion has been widely criticized and for a variety of reasons.  But 
many of the criticisms have been so obvious that Judge Easterbrook must have 
anticipated them.  Because of that, and because of the great esteem in which Judge 
Easterbrook is held, Hill v. Gateway deserves a careful analysis, and Judge Easterbrook‘s 
reasoning should be accorded considerable respect. 
Judge Easterbrook essentially follows ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.161 In ProCD 
the Seventh Circuit held that under Illinois law a customer who bought software that was 
 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1151. 
160 This has spawned a profusion of academic commentary.  See, e.g., Roger C. Bern, “Terms Late” 
Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook 
Notwithstanding, 12 J.L.&POL’Y 641 (2004), Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency 
Problem, 2004 WISC.L.REV. 679 (2004), and William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over 
Contract Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L.REV. 1099 (2004). 
161 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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on a CD contained in a box was bound by contract terms inside the box after the 
customer had an opportunity to read the terms and reject them by returning the 
software.162 The Hills attempted to distinguish their case from ProCD to no avail.  They 
first argued that ProCD should be limited to software.163 Judge Easterbrook was not 
convinced.  As he put it, “ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of software.”164 
Next they argued that ProCD was an executory contract and its precedential effect should 
be limited to executory contracts.165 Judge Easterbrook correctly observed, however, that 
the contract in ProCD was no more executory than the contract between the Hills and 
Gateway.166 In fact, sales contracts are usually executory for at least some time, since 
there are usually warranties that extend for a considerable duration.   
At oral argument, the Hills noted that in ProCD the software packaging included 
writing on the exterior that provided notice of additional terms inside.167 Thus, since the 
software was sold through retail stores, any customer who purchased it should have had 
notice of the additional terms before making the purchase.  The box containing 
Gateway’s computer did not provide such notice.168 Judge Easterbrook attributed the 
difference to the differences in the functionality of the boxes in the two cases: one was 
 
162 Id. at 1452. 
163 Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149. 
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for display, whereas the other was only for delivery.169 He thus implied that the writing 
on the box was irrelevant.  Finally, the Hills argued that they were consumers, whereas 
the customer in ProCD, Zeidenberg, was a merchant.170 Thus, the additional terms inside 
the software packaging became part of Zeidenberg’s contract with ProCD under UCC § 
2-207(2), but in their case the additional terms inside the box containing the computer did 
not become part of their contract with Gateway.  Judge Easterbrook dismissed the 
argument as inapt: the question was not whether additional terms should be added to the 
contract, but when the contract was formed.171 
Judge Easterbrook thus construed the case as one about the time of the formation 
of the contract.  Since the Seventh Circuit had already addressed a similar question in 
ProCD, and since Judge Easterbrook viewed ProCD as a controlling case, there was little 
need for further consideration of the Hill’s claim.172 Nonetheless, Judge Easterbrook 
elaborated on the policy rationale for his holding in his dicta.173 In his view, the Hills 
must have known that important contract terms would be included in the packaging when 
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172 Reliance on ProCD was highly controversial for a number of reasons.  ProCD was not a simple sales 
case, since it involved computer software.  As the preceding discussion of Advent Systems suggests, the 
appropriate choice of law for contractual disputes involving computer software remains highly contentious.  
Moreover, since many commentators believe ProCD applied Article 2 incorrectly, it is hardly persuasive 
under the similar facts of Hill v. Gateway. Finally, the dispute in ProCD did not arise from a telephone 
order, and so U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) did not apply. 
173 Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1150. 
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they ordered their computer.174 He noted that Gateway’s ads stated that their computers 
came with a limited warranty and lifetime support.175 Presumably, the Hills must have 
known that the precise terms of the warranty would be provided inside the packaging of 
their computer upon the computer’s delivery.  By implication, therefore, they should have 
known that other important contract terms might also be included inside the packaging.   
Easterbrook noted that the law provides consumers with three principal ways of 
finding out about the specific terms of their contracts.176 First of all, they can ask the 
vendor to provide the specific terms before making their purchase.177 Thus, the Hills 
could have requested the information before making their telephone order.  Second, they 
can avail themselves of the vast amount of information available from public sources, 
such as vendors’ websites, consumer publications, etc.178 The Hills presumably could 
have found out about the arbitration clause merely by doing a little research beforehand.  
Finally, consumers can simply read the information that vendors include inside the 
packaging of their products, including any information about the precise contract terms.  
The Hills clearly had an opportunity to do so; Judge Easterbrook suggests that, by 
keeping the computer for more than thirty days, they thus impliedly accepted the contract 
arbitration clause.179 
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id.
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Easterbrook implies that any inconvenience to consumers caused by the burden of 
having to research the terms of their contracts are outweighed by the practical advantages 
of allowing vendors to include contract terms in the packaging of their products.180 
Indeed, in his view, it would be highly impractical to expect all vendors to provide 
complete information about all contract terms prior to their customers’ purchases. As he 
explained, 181 
Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before 
ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales 
operations such as Gateway’s had to read the four-page statement of terms 
before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would 
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others would 
hang up in a rage over the waste of their time. And oral recitation would 
not avoid customers’ assertions…that the clerk did not read term X to 
them…. 
As one would expect, Easterbrook’s reasoning is compelling.  Some have 
doubted, however, whether the practical difficulties of providing customers with 
information prior to their purchases are as great as Easterbrook claims.182 According to 
Honnold and Reitz,183 for instance, there is no practical difficulty for sellers in 
“disclosing, or at least outlining, rights-negating terms at the point of sale… whether by 
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telephone, email, or in-store.”  But Judge Easterbrook seems to have a point.  First of all, 
it is not at all clear whether a seller would provide sufficient information to satisfy the 
formalities of contract by merely outlining right-negating terms.  Second, it is not even 
clear whether basic information about complex contract terms can be adequately 
communicated via telephone.  Customers simply may not be able to comprehend 
significant amounts of information about complex contract terms communicated over the 
telephone.  Indeed, attempts to contract around the usual contract rules in such a manner 
might well be considered unconscionable.  And finally, telephone orders in particular 
raise difficult evidentiary problems.  It is not clear how the seller could prove that every 
customer always received all the information.  Even if all telephone orders were recorded 
it would still be difficult to prove that the customer correctly heard every contract term.  
Moreover, compelling sellers to record every telephone order and establish a suitable 
system for storing and retrieving the recordings would put them to considerable expense. 
Nonetheless, on its face, Hill v. Gateway appears to misapply the UCC.  This is 
ironic, because Article 2 is quite liberal in general about the formation of contracts. UCC 
§ 2-204(1) states that a contract may be made in “any manner sufficient to show 
agreement.”184 The official comment explains that this continues the policy of 
recognizing any manner of expression -- oral, written, or other -- as sufficient to form a 
contract, subject, of course, to other rules governing the legal effect of such expressions, 
such as the parole evidence rule.185 Even the parties’ conduct can be sufficient to form a 
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contract if it is construed as recognizing the existence of an agreement.186 Indeed, UCC § 
2-204(2) states that a contract may be formed even though the “moment of its making is 
undetermined.”187 As the official comment explains, this recognizes that the interactions 
of the parties might be sufficient to form a contract without clearly indicating the precise 
point at which the formation occurred.188 UCC § 2-206(1)(a) complements UCC § 2-204 
by obliging courts to construe offers as inviting acceptance “in any manner and by any 
medium reasonable in the circumstances” unless otherwise “unambiguously 
indicated.”189 As the official comments elaborate, “this section is intended to remain 
flexible and its applicability to be enlarged as new media of communication develop or as 
the more time-saving present day media come into general use.”190 
UCC §§ 2-204(1), 2-204(2) and 2-206(1)(a) by themselves thus appear to provide 
a statutory basis for Easterbrook’s Hill v. Gateway holding.  Under UCC § 2-204(1) a 
court could construe Gateway’s delivery of the computer, complete with the terms on the 
writings inside the packaging, as an offer.  Under UCC § 2-206(1)(a) Gateway’s thirty 
day window for rejecting the terms by returning the computer could be construed as 
inviting acceptance through the Hills’ conduct -- the failure to return the computer within 
the time specified in Gateway’s offer.  This would be consonant with the policy stated in 
the official comment to UCC § 2-206 of extending the UCC’s flexible formation rules to 
a present day medium -- the telephone -- as it comes into more general commercial use.  
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Indeed, even if Gateway had not provided a thirty day window for returning the 
computer, under UCC §§ 2-204(2) and 2-206(1)(a) a court might have construed the 
Hill’s decision not to return the computer within a reasonable time as acceptance, even 
though the precise time of formation might have been indeterminable. 
But UCC §§ 2-204(1), 2-204(2), and 2-206(1)(a) do not stand by themselves. 
Although Article 2 is in general quite liberal about the formation of contracts, it provides 
a specific rule in cases where a party makes a telephone order -- or, indeed, makes an 
order to buy goods of any kind.  UCC § 2-206(1)(b) states that, “unless otherwise 
unambiguously indicated,… an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current 
shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or 
by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods….”.191 On its 
face, this appears to oblige courts to construe a telephone order, such as the one made by 
the Hills, as an offer to buy goods.  The offer should presumably be construed as one to 
buy goods subject to the usual rules of commercial contracting under Article 2, unless it 
is made in such a way as to clearly modify them.  Thus, one should presume that the 
buyer intends to retain all of her rights under the warranty of title in UCC §2-312 and the 
warranties of quality in UCC §§ 2-313, 2-314, and 2-315, as well as all of her rights to 
remedies for breaches of those warranties elsewhere in Article 2, unless she indicates 
otherwise in making her order.  The seller’s prompt or current shipment of the goods 
must be construed as an acceptance of the buyer’s offer, and unless the seller 
unambiguously indicates otherwise, the buyer is entitled to all of the usual warranties and 
remedies available under Article 2. 
 
191 U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2005). 
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A seller is nonetheless not compelled to accept all of the usual rules governing the 
buyer’s rights and remedies. As UCC § 2-206(1)(b) explains, “shipment of non-
conforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the 
buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer.”192 It is not 
entirely clear what this means, but the wording suggests that the seller can contract 
around the buyer’s usual rights and remedies.  UCC § 2-106(2) defines conforming goods 
as goods “in accordance with the obligations under the contract.”193 Nonconforming 
goods are thus presumably goods that are not in accordance with the seller’s obligations 
under the contract.  But 2-206(1)(b) states that if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer 
that the shipment is only an accommodation to the buyer, the seller’s shipment of 
nonconforming goods does not constitute an acceptance.  If it does not constitute an 
acceptance then there is no contract to which the goods can conform and this part of UCC 
§ 2-206 does not make much sense.  The reference to “the shipment of nonconforming 
goods” in UCC § 2-206(1)(b) is thus best understood as meaning a shipment that is not in 
accordance with the seller’s obligations under the terms of the buyer’s offer.  In a typical 
telephone order, the terms of the buyer’s offer would normally include all of the default 
rules of Article 2.  If the seller notified the buyer that the shipment was only an 
accommodation, however, and not an acceptance, the formation of the contract would be 
delayed.  The seller could include writings with the shipment of goods that defined the 
terms of an offer; the buyer’s conduct (such as retaining possession of the goods for more 
than thirty days) could then constitute an acceptance of the offer. 
 
192 U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2005). 
193 U.C.C. § 2-106(2) (2005). 
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Indeed, even if the seller did not explicitly contract around the usual default rules 
of Article 2 in this manner, there is a qualification placed on both parts (a) and (b) of 
UCC §§ 2-206(1) by the words, “Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the 
language or circumstances.”194 These qualifying words provide the strongest rationale 
available under Article 2 for Judge Easterbrook’s Hill v. Gateway holding, although 
ironically it is not a rationale that Easterbrook himself explicitly stated.  They imply that 
if the circumstances of a telephone order unambiguously indicate that the seller’s 
shipment of goods does not operate as an acceptance of the buyer’s offer then UCC § 2-
206(1)(b) is inapplicable.  Although Easterbrook did not explicitly develop this line of 
reasoning, his opinion leaves little doubt that he believes consumers who make telephone 
orders usually understand that the seller may include additional contract terms in the 
packaging and that the seller’s shipment of the goods does not therefore constitute an 
acceptance of the buyer’s offer.195 Whether the circumstances of a telephone order 
“unambiguously indicate” that the seller’s shipment of the goods does not operate as an 
acceptance is another matter.  Most of Easterbrook’s critics presumably believe there is 
sufficient ambiguity to make the qualification inapplicable. 
If this qualification to UCC § 2-206(1)(b) does not apply, then the contract was 
formed when Gateway shipped the computer and it did not include the terms that 
Gateway included inside the packaging, such as the arbitration clause.  Under Article 2, 
these were additional terms in an acceptance, subject to UCC § 2-207.  UCC § 2-207 
 
194 U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2005). 
195 Judge Easterbrook clearly thought that the Hills knew there would be additional terms inside the box.  
As he explained, “the Hills knew before they ordered the computer that the carton would include some 
important terms…”.  Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1150. 
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provides two rules for such situations: the “last shot” rule in UCC § 2-207(2) and the 
“knock out” rule in UCC § 2-207(3).196 This has created some confusion and controversy 
about when the particular rules are meant to apply.  Official comment 1 explains that 
UCC § 2-207 is meant to apply in two situations: the first in which an agreement has 
been reached but one or both parties send memoranda that include terms in addition to 
those agreed upon, and the second in which the parties do not clearly reach an agreement 
on any terms but agree to transact, and then exchange memoranda -- or 
“acknowledgements” -- that contain different terms.197 The classic scenario for the 
second situation is the one in which the parties exchange standard forms.  According to 
official comment 2, UCC § 2-207(2) -- the “last shot” rule -- applies to the first situation -
- the one in which an agreement has been closed -- and, by implication, section 2-207(3) -
- the “knock out” rule -- applies to situations in which an agreement on terms has not 
been reached, such as in the case of an exchange of standard forms.198 
Setting Judge Easterbrook’s holding aside, and supposing that Article 2 as 
construed here applies instead, it is not precisely clear which of the two rules should 
apply in the Hill v. Gateway situation.  The parties did not dicker or negotiate over the 
terms of their agreement, but a contract appears to have been formed nonetheless under 
 
196 Under the “last shot” rule, in a contract between merchants additional terms are automatically added to 
the contract unless the offeror limited the terms of acceptance to the terms of the offer, or they would 
materially alter the contract, or the offeror objects within a reasonable time.  Under the “knock out’ rule, 
the terms of the contract consist of those terms on which the parties writings agree plus any additional 
terms implied by Article 2.  See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 147 at 59-66 for an explanation. 
197 U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt 1 (2005). 
198 U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt 2 (2005). 
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UCC § 2-206(1)(b).  Since the parties did not exchange standard forms, the case for 
applying the last shot rule may seem the strongest.  Nonetheless, official comment 7 
states that “in many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and paid for before any 
dispute arises, there is no question of whether a contract has been made…[and]….the 
only question is what terms are included….”.199 According to official comment 7, in 
such a case “subsection (3) [the knock out rule] furnishes the governing rule.”200 
Regardless of which rule applies, however, the outcome would appear to favor the Hills.  
Under the last shot rule, the terms of their agreement were defined at the time 
Gateway shipped the computer.  The contract included all of the default rules of Article 
2, since the parties did not agree to any special contract terms of their own.  Under UCC 
§ 2-207(2) the terms on the writings inside the box should have been construed as 
proposals for addition to the contract.201 Between merchants such proposals 
automatically become part of the contract unless the offer expressly limit’s the terms of 
acceptance to the terms of the offer, or they materially alter it, or the party receiving them 
gives notice of objection to them within a reasonable time.202 The Hills were clearly 
consumers and not merchants.203 UCC § 2-207(2) does not state any conditions under 
which the proposed additional terms become part of the contract if the recipient is not a 
merchant.  Presumably they do not become part of the contract without the recipient’s 
 
199 U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt 7 (2005). 
200 U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt 7 (2005). 
201 U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2005). 
202 U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2005). 
203 U.C.C. § 2-104(1) defines a merchant as “a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise holds 
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction…”. 
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consent.  Since the Hills did not consent to any of the additional terms, including the 
arbitration clause, the additional terms could not have become part of the contract.  
Under the knock out rule of UCC § 2-207(3) the contract would include all those 
terms on which the writings of the parties agreed plus any supplemental terms included 
under other provisions of Article 2.204 Since the Hills did not provide a writing, none of 
the terms in Gateway’s writings could have been included in the contract unless they 
would also have been included by other provisions of Article 2.  Since none of the other 
provisions of Article 2 would have implied an arbitration clause, the arbitration clause 
clearly could not have become part of the contract under the knock out rule.  It is doubtful 
whether any of the other terms in Gateway’s writings could have become part of the 
contract either.  The terms of the contract could only have been those provided by the 
default rules of Article 2. 
Easterbrook has been widely criticized by scholars who argue that he did not 
follow the UCC.205 Indeed, there seems little doubt that his ruling was motivated 
primarily by policy considerations and that he relied on the ProCD precedent to 
circumvent the implications of Article 2.  This is regrettable because it has only 
confounded the effect of his ruling and compromised his objective, which appears to have 
been to resolve the conundrum raised by “terms later” contracts for the sale of goods.206 
Easterbrook clearly felt that utilitarian considerations favored a change in the rules, and 
 
204 U.C.C § 2-207(3) (2005). 
205 See e.g. Bern, supra note 160 and Lawrence, supra note 160. 
206 As Easterbrook noted in his opinion, these are quite common in contracts for services.  As he explained, 
“Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transportation, insurance, and many 
other endeavors.”  Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149. 
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there is good reason to believe he is right (although these are not the only considerations).  
Requiring sellers to provide notice of the additional terms at the time of buyers’ 
telephone orders would raise significant evidentiary problems.207 How would sellers 
prove that sufficient notice was given in every telephone order?  Would every telephone 
order have to be recorded and stored until the statute of limitations on any potential cause 
of action expired?  Would such recordings be admissible? 
In spite of all the criticisms of Easterbrook’s opinion, it is not clear that adhering 
to a strict interpretation of UCC § 2-206(1)(b) will ultimately prove to be in the best 
interests of consumers.  Forcing sellers to jump through hoops to contract around Article 
2’s default rules or to simply forego arbitration clauses and other contractual 
arrangements that reduce their expected legal costs will result in higher prices for goods 
purchased through telephone orders.  We can only speculate, but its seems reasonable to 
guess that most consumers, if given the choice, would probably opt to subject themselves 
to arbitration clauses and other reasonable limitations on their contract rights if it meant 
getting the goods for lower prices.  After all, how many manufacturers offer “full 
warranties” under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act because consumers prefer to them 
to limited warranties?208 How many consumers in general decline to make purchases 
because they object to limited warranties and arbitration clauses?209 We do not have any 
 
207 See the discussion supra p. 50. 
208 According to Honnold & Reitz, supra note 183 at 289, “The hope that most manufacturers of consumer 
durable goods would offer FULL WARRANTIES has proven to be unfounded.” 
209 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law 35 J.LEGAL STUD. 199, 206-225 
(2006) for a discussion of consumers’ “optimism bias” and various legal strategies for addressing the 
problems it raises. 
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systematic evidence, but casual observation suggests that most consumers are not willing 
to pay much for contract rights with uncertain or unknown values.  Of course, this may 
reflect the limits on their rationality, and to the extent that it does, consumer protections 
of some kind could be necessary to vindicate their rights and enhance the public welfare.  
But those protections could take some form other than cumbrous constraints on sellers’ 
efforts to service telephone orders.210 
The real problem with Hill v. Gateway seems to arise not from the rule that 
Easterbrook fashioned, but from the cavalier way it dispenses with some of the values 
that are deeply embedded in modern contract law.  Most scholars and other commentators 
would probably not object to a delay in the timing of contract formation if consumers 
were made aware that additional terms they had not already explicitly assented to were 
going to be added to their contracts unless they returned the goods within some 
reasonable time.  Indeed, some other courts have rejected arbitration clauses that sellers 
included on writings inside the packaging of their goods on the grounds that the terms 
had not been assented to.211 Judge Easterbrook seems to believe that consumers 
commonly understand that important contract terms are included in writings on or inside 
the packaging of goods; other scholars seem to disagree.  The question could be resolved 
through an empirical study, but that would probably be beside the point.  The real issue is 
whether consumers need to be protected from inadvertently waiving their Article 2 rights. 
 
210 See Id. for a discussion of alternative approaches to consumer protection. 
211 See e.g. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div 1998) (Gateway’s arbitration clause 
held to be unconscionable) or Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp., 52 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 795 (R.I. Super. 
2004) (Dell’s arbitration clause not enforced because the buyer had not assented to it). 
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Setting the controversy over the merits of his ruling aside, Judge Easterbrook 
clearly sought to revise the law with his holding.  His efforts have been at best a mixed 
success.  Although Hill v. Gateway has been followed in some cases,212 it has been 
rejected in others.213 As things stand, the law governing the matter in most jurisdictions 
is uncertain.  The uncertainty arises not because Article 2 is unclear, or because state 
courts have independently shown an inclination to modify it through liberal 
interpretations, rather, it is unclear because the Seventh Circuit has provided a 
controversial ruling on a question of state law where the state law was perfectly clear in a 
conscious attempt to revise the law. 
 
C.  Failures of Limited Remedies and Exclusions of Consequential Damages 
 Most sophisticated manufacturers attempt to limit their liabilities for breach of 
both express and implied warranties.214 They do so by making as few warranties as 
possible, and by limiting buyers’ rights to damages for breaches of any warranties they 
do make.  The UCC regulates sellers’ attempts to exclude or modify express and implied 
warranties in UCC § 2-316.215 It also regulates their attempts to exclude or limit damages 
 
212 See Filias v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 197 WL 33814599 (E.D. Mich. 1998), and Brower v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998). 
213 See Klocek v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000), and Defontes v. Dell 
Computers Corp., 52 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 795 (R.I. Super. 2004). 
214 HONNOLD & REITZ, supra note 183 at 202. 
215 U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2005) precludes sellers from excluding express warranties once made (“negation or 
limitation is inoperative” to the extent that it cannot reasonably be interpreted as consistent with the 
wording or conduct by which express warranties were created), and U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2005) states that 
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in UCC § 2-379.216 Most sophisticated manufacturers attempt to make as few express 
warranties as they can,217 and to exclude all implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness.218 They also commonly avail themselves of the provisions of UCC § 2-719(1) to 
offer a limited remedy to repair or replace the goods in substitution for the remedies of 
the UCC.219 In addition, to the extent that they can, they typically also exclude all 
consequential damages.220 
“to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability …the language must mention 
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied 
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.”. 
216 U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (2005) states that “Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail 
of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.”  As official comment 1 explains, 
“under subsection (2), where an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its 
purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the 
general remedy provisions of this Article.” 
217 Consistent, of course, with their marketing objectives for their products.  Once made, express warranties 
cannot be disclaimed (U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2005)), so it behooves sellers to avoid making any superfluous 
warranties.. 
218 This is usually done in language that complies with U.C.C. §2-316(2), although U.C.C. §2-316(3) 
provides some useful alternatives. 
219 U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) (2005) allows a limited remedy clause “in addition to or in substitution” for the 
default remedies under Article 2; U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (2005) states that the limited remedy is presumed to 
“optional” unless “expressly agreed to be exclusive.”  Needless to say, most sophisticated manufacturers 
include wording in the writings to ensure that the limited remedies will be exclusive. 
220 U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2005) allows the limitation or exclusion of consequential damages unless “the 
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.”  
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This has created some confusion.  Courts have struggled over the appropriate 
interpretation of Article 2 in cases where sellers’ attempts to limit their buyers’ remedies 
fail to satisfy the regulatory provisions of UCC § 2-719.221 According to UCC § 2-
719(2), when a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, the buyer has recourse to all 
the default remedies under Article 2.222 Of course, these include expectation damages 
under UCC § 2-714223 as well as incidental and consequential damages under UCC § 2-
715.224 But UCC § 2-719 also allows sellers to exclude or limit a buyer’s right to 
consequential damages.  The only regulations on the seller’s right to exclude 
consequential damages are that the exclusion may not be unconscionable225 and that 
consequential damages may not be excluded or limited for personal injury in the case 
where the buyer is a consumer.226 Where the buyer is a merchant, therefore, the only 
 
221 See the discussion in GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 147 at 387-390. 
222 As suggested in official comment 1, the test is whether the limited remedy “fails in its purpose or 
operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain.”  U.C.C. § 2-719, cmt. 1 (2005). 
223 U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2005) states that “The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference 
at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have 
had if they had been as warranted”.  While the interpretation is not transparent, this apparently includes 
damages applicable under the conventional doctrine of expectancy or expectation damages.  See 
GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 147 at 349-354.  
224 U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (2005) authorizes incidental damages and U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (2005) authorizes 
consequential damages. 
225 Of course, since the doctrine of unconscionability seems to apply to all contract clauses under 2-302 this 
additional prohibition in 2-719 may be redundant. 
226 U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2005) states that limitation of consequential damages “for injury to the person in the 
case of consumer goods in prima facie unconscionable”. 
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regulation is that the exclusion may not be unconscionable, and since courts are reluctant 
to apply the doctrine of unconscionability when invoked by a merchant,227 Article 2 in 
effect places very little constraint on sellers’ ability to exclude consequential damages.  
Confusion arises, however, when sellers’ limited remedies fail of their essential purpose 
and the seller has also sought to exclude consequential damages in a separate and distinct 
contract clause.   
 Does the provision in UCC § 2-719(2) which provides the buyer with recourse to 
all the default remedies in Article 2 trump the additional clause purporting to exclude 
consequential damages, or does the exclusion of consequential damages clause stand 
independently of whether the limitation of remedy fails?  The early case law held that the 
failure of the limitation of remedy nullified the seller’s attempt to exclude consequential 
damages.228 This was not a particularly convincing interpretation.  If the seller’s 
limitation of remedy does not fail of its essential purpose then that alone will be sufficient 
to deny the buyer any consequential damages.  Whether the contract includes an 
additional clause purporting to exclude consequential damages will be irrelevant.  If the 
failure of the seller’s limitation of remedy clause nullifies the seller’s attempt to exclude 
consequential damages then the additional clause purporting to exclude consequential 
damages is again irrelevant.  In other words, under this early reading of the Code, an 
 
227 The doctrine of unconscionability is usually applied through a two prong test, the first of which inquires 
as to whether there was any procedural abuse and the second whether there was any substantive abuse.  The 
procedural abuse prong looks for a variety of indicia, including whether there was any disparity in the 
bargaining capacities of the parties.  Merchants are usually presumed to be relatively sophisticated in 
bargaining.  See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 147 at 176-183 for a discussion. 
228 See Id. at 387 for a discussion. 
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additional contract clause purporting to exclude consequential damages under UCC § 2-
719(3) would have been irrelevant if the seller had also sought to limit the buyer’s 
remedy under UCC § 2-719(1). 
 Since rational parties would not normally draft irrelevant contract terms, this is 
not a particularly compelling interpretation of the Code.  A more convincing 
interpretation, and the one that is dominant in the recent case law,229 would give an 
independent effect to any contract clause that sought to exclude consequential damages.  
Under this approach, whether the exclusion of consequential damages was effective 
would be completely independent of whether the limitation of remedy failed of its 
essential purpose.  Thus, the limitation of remedy would be effective as long as it did not 
fail of its essential purpose, and as long as it was effective, the exclusion of consequential 
damages clause would be irrelevant.  But if the limitation of remedy did fail of its 
essential purpose the exclusion of consequential damages clause would remain effective 
unless a court determined that it also failed for independent reasons.230 The clause 
excluding consequential damages would provide an additional layer of protection for the 
seller and would therefore at least serve an intelligible purpose.  Since a contract 
interpretation that imputes an intelligible purpose to contract terms seems preferable to 
one that does not, this seems the more compelling approach.   
 In a recent line of cases, however, the Ninth Circuit has confounded the question 
by adopting a third approach.  To begin with, in S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int’l., Inc.,231 
229 Id.
230 In other words, it would remain effective as long as it was not unconscionable or it did not apply to 
consequential damages for personal injuries suffered by a consumer.  U.C.C. § 2-719(3). 
231 S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int’l., Inc., 587 F.2d 1363. 
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the Ninth Circuit predicted that California courts would treat the failure of a limited 
remedy clause and the effectiveness of an exclusion of consequential damages clause as 
independent questions232 (there were no state court precedents to follow), and upheld an 
exclusion of consequential damages clause even though the limitation of remedy clause 
failed of its essential purpose.233 This in itself was no great departure from the drift of the 
case law.  The court buttressed the rationale for its holding, however, by stating that “The 
default of the seller is not so total and fundamental as to require that its consequential 
damage limitation be expunged from the contract.”234 It may well have been true that 
Smith’s default was not “total and fundamental”, but whatever that standard might mean, 
it does not derive from Article 2.  The Ninth Circuit seemed to suggest that if Smith’s 
breach had been “total and fundamental” this would have justified expunging the 
exclusion of consequential damages from the contract regardless of the UCC. 
 Since this was merely dicta, it did not by itself mark a departure from the 
dominant approach, but in hindsight it foreshadowed a drift in Court’s jurisprudence.  
The Ninth Circuit subsequently revisited the question in Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Freuhauf 
Corp., a case that arose under Washington law.235 The buyer in that case had contracted 
for the purchase of thirteen dump truck bodies.236 The seller had created an express 
 
232 As the court explained, “Consequential damages were assigned to the buyer, Wilson….  The seller 
Smith did not ignore his obligation to repair; he simply was unable to perform it.  This is not enough to 
require the seller to absorb losses the buyer plainly agreed to bear.“  Id. at 1375. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Freuhauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984). 
236 Id. at 1310. 
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warranty that the truck bodies would be suitable for the purpose of transporting wet 
concrete.237 When that turned out not to be true, the seller made no attempt to repair or 
replace them.  The question of the effect of the failure of the limitation of remedy clause 
on the exclusion of consequential damages went to the Ninth Circuit.  The Ninth Circuit 
reiterated its adherence to the “case-by-case” approach to determining whether the two 
clauses were inseparable parts of the risk-allocation or independent,238 but this time held 
that the exclusion of consequential damages was ineffective.239 The Ninth Circuit quoted 
directly from the trial court’s opinion: “It cannot be maintained that it was the parties 
intention that Defendant be enabled to avoid all consequential liability for breach by first 
agreeing to an alternative remedy provision designed to avoid consequential harms, and 
then scuttling that alternative through its recalcitrance in honoring the agreement.”240 
Setting aside any questions about whether a limitation of remedy clause is 
intended to prevent consequential harms,241 the most striking implication of this quotation 
is that the Court apparently did not read the exclusion of consequential damages clause as 
separate and distinct from the limitation of remedy clause.  Of course, if the exclusion of 
consequential damages is not made in a clause separate and distinct from the limitation of 
 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 1314-1315. 
239 Id. at 1315. 
240 Id. 
241 It seems clear that it is not directly intended to do so.  Rather, it is directly intended to limit the buyer’s 
remedy for breaches (and the seller’s exposure to liabilities) regardless of whether consequential harms 
were incurred.  Of course, a buyer may reasonably believe that if the limited remedy serves its essential 
purpose there will be no consequential harms.  
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remedy clause then it cannot stand as a separate clause of the contract.  Since there is no 
other independent clause limiting the buyer’s damages, the failure of the limitation of 
remedy clause is then tantamount to the failure of the limitation on the buyer’ right to 
consequential damages.  Perhaps viewed in this light, Fiorito did not mark such a drastic 
departure from the case law either.   
 The Ninth Circuit revisited the question yet again, however, in Milgard 
Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp.242 This time its treatment of the problem clearly did mark 
a departure from the dominant approach.  In Milgard the buyer transacted for the design 
and delivery of a tempering furnace through what the Court described as a “carefully 
negotiated contracted.”243 The seller, Selas, regarded the design of the furnace as 
“experimental” but agreed to deliver it for what the Court clearly regarded as a hefty 
price of $1.45 million.244 The contract also included some timeliness provisions.  When 
Selas was unable to meet these, the parties were initially able to settle out of court, but 
when Selas failed to perform within the additional period provided under the settlement 
agreement the case ensued.245 At trial Selas was initially granted a summary judgment, 
but this was overturned on appeal.246 On remand the trial court held that the limited 
remedy clause failed of its essential purpose and that Selas’ default was fundamental 
 
242 Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp., 902 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1990). 
243 Id. at 705. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 706. 
246 Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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enough to nullify the exclusion of consequential damages.247 Milgard was awarded over 
$1 million in net damages.248 
Selas appealed on two grounds:  first, that the trial court erred in holding that the 
limited remedy clause failed of its essential purpose, and second, that the trial court erred 
in holding that the failure of the limited remedy invalidated the exclusion of 
consequential damages.249 Judge Hall upheld the trial court on the failure of the limited 
remedy clause rather summarily and then addressed the question of consequential 
damages at greater length.  He rejected the notion that a characterization of the seller’s 
breach as “total and fundamental” had any bearing on the effectiveness of an exclusion of 
consequential damages clause and reiterated the Court’s aversion to “talismanic 
analysis.”250 As he explained, the appropriate test was “whether Selas’ default caused a 
loss which was not part of the bargained-for allocation of risk”.251 Indeed, this was the 
test that the trial court had actually applied, and Judge Hall therefore also upheld the trial 
court’s “decision to lift the cap on consequential damages.”252 As he explained, “Milgard 
did not agree to pay $1.45 million in order to participate in a science experiment.”253 
247 Milgard, 902 F.2d at 709. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 The Ninth Circuit had expressed its distaste for “talismanic analysis” the first time it addressed the case. 
in Milgard, 761 F.2d at 556. 
251 Milgard, 902 F.2d at 709. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
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Here Judge Hall not only departed from the drift of the case law, he comes close 
to contradicting some of the fundamental principles of modern contract law.  The opinion 
reprints both the limited remedy and the exclusion of consequential damages clauses, 
which were contained in the same paragraph of the writing.  It is instructive to reprint this 
paragraph here:254 
In the event of a breach of any warranty, express implied or statutory, or in the even the 
equipment is found to be defective in workmanship or material or fails to conform to the 
specifications thereof, [Selas] liability shall be limited to the repair or replacement of 
such equipment as is found to be defective or non-conforming, provided that written 
notice of any such defect or non-conformity must be given to Selas within 1 year from 
the date of acceptance, or 15 months from completion of shipment, whichever first 
occurs.  In the event that acceptance is delayed through the fault of Selas, then the Selas 1 
year warranty shall be applicable and shall not begin until the date of acceptance.  Selas 
assumes no liability for no [sic] consequential or incidental damages of any kind 
(including fire or explosion in the starting, testing, or subsequent operation of the 
equipment), and the Purchaser assumes all liability for the consequences of its use or 
misuse by the Purchaser or his employees.  In no event shall Selas be liable for damages 
resulting from the non-operation of Purchaser’s plant, loss of product, raw materials, or 
production as a result of the use, misuse or inability to use the equipment covered by this 
proposal…. 
A plain reading of this paragraph clearly indicates that the limitation of remedy 
and exclusion of consequential damages clauses were separate and distinct.  The 
limitation of remedy in contained in the first sentence; the exclusion of consequential 
damages is contained in the subsequent two sentences.  In fact, the second sentence 
excludes consequential damages associated with the use or misuse of the furnace, and the 
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third sentence excludes any damages associated with the buyer’s inability to use the 
furnace.  The damages that Milgard incurred consisted primarily of lost profits as a result 
of its inability to use the furnace.255 These damages should have been excluded by the 
third sentence.  The wording was clear that “In no event” should Selas have been liable 
for damages resulting from Milgard’s inability to use the furnace.256 Presumably, that 
was meant to include the event of the limited remedy failing of its essential purpose.  
Together with the fact that this third sentence is separated from the limitation of remedy 
clause by the second sentence, the wording clearly implies that the exclusion of 
consequential damages was separate and distinct from the limitation of remedy and 
intended to provide Selas with an additional layer of protection. 
 Judge Hall nonetheless nullified the effect of this exclusion of damages on the 
grounds that it had not been bargained-for.257 A clear clause in a writing is normally 
evidence of what the parties had bargained-for, especially when the court characterizes 
the contract as one that was “carefully negotiated.”258 In this case, however, Judge Hall 
looked to Milgard’s consideration – a price of $1.45 million – and inferred that the 
exclusion of consequential damages was not part of the bargain.  Although the inclusion 
of a clause limiting the buyer’s right to damages in a contract with such a high price 
might be considered so grossly unfair as to shock a court’s conscience, this by itself could 
only satisfy one prong of the test for unconscionability.259 For the unconscionability 
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doctrine to apply there must also have been some procedural abuse in the negotiation of 
the contract that exposed the party to an unfair surprise.260 Since the court acknowledged 
that the contract in this case was “carefully negotiated”261 that could hardly have been the 
case. 
 Judge Hall seemed to believe that Milgard could not possibly have agreed to such 
a sweeping exclusion of consequential damages.  As he put it, Milgard did not agree to 
pay $1.45 million for a “science experiment.”262 But here Judge Hall comes very close to 
contradicting one of the fundamental principles of modern contract law, alternatively 
known as the “adequacy doctrine “or the “peppercorn theory.”  Under the peppercorn 
theory263 courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration in determining whether 
there is an enforceable contract; the mere fact of consideration itself is sufficient.264 In 
Milgard, Judge Hall looks to the buyer’s consideration – a price of $1.45 million – as 
evidence of what the buyer had bargained-for and concludes that it must have been more 
than a furnace with a limited remedy and no consequential damages regardless of 
whether the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose.  But the parties’ writing clearly 
 
260 As official comment 1 to U.C.C § 2-302 explains, “The principle is one of the prevention of oppression 
and unfair surprise.” 
261 Milgard, 902 F.2d at 705. 
262 Milgard, 902 F.2d at 709. 
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included a separate and distinct clause excluding consequential damages.  Judge Hall 
looks to Milgard’s consideration – primarily the contract price – as evidence of Selas’ 
consideration – whether Selas was to provide consequential damages in the event its 
limited remedy failed.  In treating Milgard’s consideration as evidence that Selas’ 
consideration must have been more than merely a furnace with a limited remedy and no 
consequential damages, even though there was a separate and distinct contract clause that 
clearly excluded consequential damages, Judge Hall came very close to holding that 
Selas’ consideration under the contract was inadequate. 
 Some commentators have written favorably about this approach to the problem.265 
While there is nothing in principle wrong with a court looking to the parties’ 
consideration as a means of determining the scope of their bargain, Judge Hall’s opinion 
in Milgard goes further.  It looks to the buyer’s consideration to trump a separate and 
distinct clause in the writing excluding consequential damages.  In this regard, it comes 
close to making a judgment about the adequacy of the seller’s consideration.  To put the 
matter in perspective, could Judge Hall have held that the contract price was not in fact 
$1.45 million, in spite of the clear evidence otherwise, simply because the writing 
included a clause excluding consequential damages and because no sensible buyer would 
have paid that much for the furnace without the right to consequential damages in the 
event that the limited remedy failed?  The only circumstance that prevents Judge Hall’s 
decision from blatantly violating the adequacy of consideration doctrine is some lingering 
doubt about whether the clause excluding consequential damages was truly understood 
by the buyer to be separate and distinct from the limited remedy clause.   
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Fortunately, Judge Hall’s decision has not been widely followed.266 Nonetheless, 
it injects some additional uncertainty into many commercial sales transactions.  Sellers 
who wish to provide themselves with a layer of protection against consequential damages 
claims beyond the one provided by a limited remedy clause may have difficulty in doing 
so.  Writing a separate and distinct clause that clearly excludes consequential damages 
may not be enough.  In the event of a dispute a court may decide to follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s precedent in Milgard, and hold that the buyer’s consideration is large enough to 
trump a plain reading of the writing.   
 
D.  Summary 
These three cases offer concrete examples of how federal courts in three different 
Circuits have used their discretion in conscious attempts to reinterpret and revise modern 
sales law.  In Advent Systems Judge Weis of the Third Circuit held that computer 
software was a good within the meaning of Article 2 even though the question was not 
directly raised by the case; he thus sought to bring within the scope of the UCC a wide 
range of transactions in computer information that might otherwise have been governed 
 
266 Id. Although some other courts have purported to follow a similar “case-by-case” approach (see, e.g., 
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them relied on the size of the buyer’s consideration to trump a separate and distinct clause excluding 
consequential damages.  Some courts have clearly rejected the Milgard approach (see, e.g., The Golden 
Reward Mining Company v. Jervis Webb Company 772 F.Supp. 1118 (C.C.W.D. SD 1991), and Jim 
Pierce and Karen Pierce v. Catalina Yachts, Inc. 2 P.3d 618 (Alaska 2000)). 
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by state common law.267 In Hill v. Gateway Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit 
followed a dubious precedent instead of the letter of Article 2 in a bold attempt to revise 
the rules of contract formation and legitimize “terms later” contracts in sales 
transactions.268 And in Milgard, Judge Hall of the Ninth Circuit stretched the “case-by-
case” approach to determining the effectiveness of damage exclusion clauses when 
limited remedy clauses fail so far that he came very close to contradicting the adequacy 
of consideration doctrine.269 In each case the court based its holding on policy 
considerations rather than state legal authorities or predictions about how the state 
supreme court would rule.  And in each case one wonders whether a state court would 
have felt emboldened or motivated to render a similar holding in the face of the same 
questions. 
 In Advent Systems the Third Circuit overruled the district court’s decision to apply 
Pennsylvania common law instead of Article 2.270 Judge Weis looked to the language 
used in the writing, the manner of billing, and the nature of the items that had been 
contracted for in a manner consistent with the predominant factor test.271 He could have 
easily held that Article 2 applied on this basis alone without also holding that computer 
software is a good.  Indeed, one wonders whether a Pennsylvania Superior Court would 
have done the same.272 Since the holding was completely unnecessary to the disposition 
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of the case, any state court judge should have feared being overruled on the matter by the 
state supreme court.  Moreover, one wonders whether any state court judge would have 
had the same motivation to extend the scope of Article 2.  Was the volume of contract 
cases involving computer software in Pennsylvania large enough to have made the matter 
so important?  Judge Weis purported to apply Pennsylvania law to the case, but it is clear 
that he looked well beyond Pennsylvania’s borders when making his utilitarian 
calculations. 
 Similar observations can be made about Hill v. Gateway and Milgard. In Hill v. 
Gateway Judge Easterbrook declined to follow Article 2, even though it seemed to offer a 
clear answer to the question raised by the case.273 Would any judge on the Appellate 
Court of Illinois have ignored the state statute in favor of a Seventh Circuit precedent that 
clearly also ignored the state statute?274 That is difficult to imagine.  Would any judge on 
the Appellate Court of Illinois -- subject to reelection every six years275 -- have 
disregarded an Illinois statute to take the side of a corporate computer manufacturer 
against a consumer?  That is also difficult to imagine.  It is perhaps easier to imagine how 
a judge on the Washington Court of Appeals276 could have relied on the size of the 
contract price to invalidate an exclusion of consequential damages clause, as Judge Hall 
did in Milgard.277 But it is still not easy.  Judge Hall’s holding in Milgard developed a 
line of jurisprudence that the Ninth Circuit began in S.M. Wilson & Co. and continued in 
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Fiorito.278 In S.M Wilson & Co. the Ninth Circuit purported to apply California law and 
in Fiorito it purported to apply Washington law.279 The Ninth Circuit thus predicted that 
the state supreme courts in both California and Washington would depart from the 
dominant approach in favor of a “case-by-case” analysis.  How plausible is that?  Judge 
Hall’s deference to Washington law in Milgard was obviously no more than a formality; 
the Ninth Circuit was clearly developing its own jurisprudence. 
 All three cases illustrate how the federal courts have often used their discretion in 
conscious attempts to reinterpret and revise modern sales law.  Indeed, they illustrate how 
little regard the federal courts have sometimes paid to state legal authorities or their 
obligation to predict how the state supreme court would rule on the same question in 
sales law cases.  Instead, as the examples suggest, they have often looked to broader 
policy considerations in attempts to fashion rules that are not only consonant with their 
utilitarian calculations, but will transcend jurisdictional boundaries.  In this regard, they 
are behaving much as if they were still in the Swift v. Tyson era, when the federal courts 
commonly appealed to the law of the merchant in attempts to construct a body of general 
commercial law that cohered with the underlying principles of commerce. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Almost seventy years after the Supreme Court sought to rationalize the American 
system of judicial federalism in Erie, sales law remains trapped in a pattern more 
reminiscent of the Swift v. Tyson era.  The extraordinarily wide separation of powers in 
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the NCCUSL-ALI uniform law-making process has entrenched Article 2 of the UCC in 
the status quo.  Concurrently, an imbalance between the federal and state courts in the 
American system of judicial federalism has conferred an unusually wide range of 
discretion over state commercial law on the federal courts.  Ironically, therefore, state 
sales statutes are being reinterpreted and revised by the federal courts rather than the state 
legislatures or state courts.  The federal courts are thus the most important source of 
innovation and experimentation in modern American sales law, but the role they play is 
not entirely consistent with modern notions of democracy and judicial restraint.  
Moreover, it is debatable whether they have brought much rationality and coherence to 
the law or simply injected uncertainty and disharmony instead.   
 At this point it appears that the pattern will persist.  Thus, the federal courts will 
probably remain the most important source of new developments in sales law for some 
time to come.  But it is doubtful whether these developments will converge and therefore 
whether sales law will remain uniform.  Indeed, the converse seems far more likely.  
Neither federal nor state courts have rushed to follow cases such as Advent Systems, Hill 
v. Gateway, and Milgard, which have rendered important new holdings on fundamental 
questions of the law, and it appears unlikely that they will do so anytime soon.  It seems 
inevitable that American sales law will continue to diverge, not only across jurisdictions 
but further and further away from the rickety framework of Article 2.  American sales 
law therefore will not only continue to devolve into something more akin to the common 
law, it will remain an area of disjunction in which the federal courts play the dominant 
role in developing the law, even though the law is still formally within the authority of 
the states.   
